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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
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Some formalisms gain a sudden success and it is not always immediately clear why. Consider the case 
of logic programming. It was introduced in an article of KOWALSKI [K] in 1974 and for a long time -
in the case of computer science - not much happened. But now, 13 years later already the Journal of 
Logic Programming and Annual Conferences on the subject exist and a few hundred of articles on it 
have been published. 
Its success can be attributed to at least two circumstances. First of all, logic programming is closely 
related to PROLOG. In fact, logic programming constitutes its theorical framework. And PROLOG 
gained in turn a success mainly due to its inclusion in the Japanese Fifth Generation Project. 
Secondly, in the early eighties a flurry of research on alternative programming styles started and sud-
denly it turned out that some candidates already existed and even for a considerable time. This led to 
a renewed interest in logic programming and its extensions. 
The power of logic programming stems from two reasons. First, it is an extremely simple formal-
ism. So simple, that some, when confronted with it for the first time, say "Is that all?". Next, it relies 
on mathematical logic which developed its own methods and techniques and which provides a 
rigorous mathematical framework. (It should be stated however, that the main basis of logic program-
ming is automatic theorem proving which was developed mainly by computer scientists.) 
The aim of this article is to provide a self-contained introduction to the theory of logic program-
ming. In the presentation we try to shed light on the causal dependence between various concepts and 
notions. Throughout the paper we attempt to adhere to the notation of LLOYD [L], the book which 
obviously influenced our presentation. This will hopefully further contribute to the standardization of 
the notation and terminology in the domain. 
1.2. Plan of this paper 
We now provide a short description of the content the paper. It is hoped that this will facilitate its 
reading and will allow a better understanding of the structure of its subject. 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to introduce in the fastest possible way the notion of SLD-resolution cen-
tral to the subject of logic programming. 
In Chapter 3 a semantics is introduced with the purpose of establishing soundness of SLD-
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resolution and several forms of its completeness. Most of these results are collected in the Success 
·Theorem 3.26. 
In Chapter 4 the computability by means of logic programs is investigated. It is among others 
shown that all recursive functions are computed by logic programs. 
SLD-resolution allows us to derive only positive statements. Chapter 5 deals with the other side of 
the coin - the derivability of the negative statements. After rejecting the Closed World Assumption rule 
as ineffective, the full effort is directed at an analysis of a weaker but effective rule - the Negation as 
Failure rule and its relation to the construction called completion of a program. The final outcome is 
the Finite Failure Theorem 5.30 dual to the Success Theorem. 
After this extensive analysis of how to deal with positive and with negative statements, the mixed 
statements (so called general goals) are investigated in Chapter 6. While the resulting form of resolu-
tion (called here SLDNF- -resolution) is sound, the completeness can be obtained only after imposing 
a number of restrictions, both on the logic programs and the general goals. 
The paper concludes by a short discussion of related topics which are divided into six sections: gen-
eral programs, alternative approaches, deductive databases, PROLOG, integration of logic and func-
tional programming, and applications in artificial intelligence. 
Finally, in the appendix a short history of the subject is traced. 
2. SYNTAX AND PROOF THEORY 
2.1. First order languages 
Logic programs are simply sets of certain formulas of a first order language. So to define them we 
recall first what a first order language is, a notion essentially due to G. Frege. By necessity our treat-
ment is reduced to a list of definitions. A reader wishing a more motivated introduction should con-
sult one or more standard books on the subject. Personally, we recommend MANIN [M] and SHOEN-
FIELD [S]. 
A first order language consists of an alphabet and all formulas defined over it. 
An alphabet consists of the following classes of symbols: 
a) variables denoted by x,y,z,v,u, ... , 
b) constants denoted by a,b,c,d,. .. , 
c) function symbols denoted by f,g,., .. , 
d) relation symbols denoted by p,q,r, ... , 
e) propositional constants, which are: true and false, 
f) connectives, which are: ..., (negation), v (disjunction), /\ (conjunction), ~ (implication) and ~ 
(equivalence), 
g) quantifiers, which are: 3 (there exists) and V (for all), 
h) parentheses, which are: ( and ) and the comma, that is: ,. 
Thus the sets of connectives, quantifiers and parentheses are fixed. We assume also that the set of 
variables is infinite and fixed. Those classes of symbols are called logical symbols. The other classes of 
symbols, that is constants, relation symbols (or just relations) and function symbols (or just fanctions) 
may vary and in particular may be empty. They are called nonlogical symbols. 
Each function and relation symbol has a fixed arity, that is the number of arguments. We assume 
that functions have a positive arity - the role of 0-ary functions is played by the constants. In con-
trast, 0-ary relations are admitted. They are called propositional symbols, or simply propositions. Note 
that each alphabet is uniquely determined by its constants, functions and relations. 
We now define by induction two classes of strings of symbols over a given alphabet. First we define 
the class of terms as follows: 
a) a variable is a term, 
b) a constant is a term, 
c) if /is an n-ary function and t1, ... ,tn are terms then/{ti. ... ,tn) is a term. 
Terms are denoted by s,t,u. Finally, we define the class of formulas as follows: 
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a) if p is an n-aIJ relation and ti, .. .,tn are terms then p(ti. ... ,tn) is a formula (called an atomic for-
mula, or just an atom), 
b) true and false are formulas, 
c) if F and G are formulas then so are (-,F), (FvG), (F l\G), (F-+G) and (F~G), 
d) if Fis a formula and x is a variable then (3xF) and ('lxF) are formulas. 
Sometimes we shall write (G~F) instead of (F-+G). Some well known binaIJ functions (like +)or 
relations (like =) are usually written in an infix notation. Atomic formulas are denoted by A,B and 
formulas in general by F, G. 
Given two strings of symbols e 1 and e2 from the alphabet we write e 1 = e2 when e 1 and e2 are 
identical. Usually these strings will be terms or formulas. 
The definition of formulas is rigorous at the expense of excessive use of parentheses. One way to 
eliminate most of them is by introducing a binding order among the connectives and quantifiers. We 
thus assume that --.,3 and V bind stronger than v which in turn binds stronger than /\ which binds 
stronger than -+ and -E-7. Also, we assume that V,/\,-+ and -E-7 associate to the right and omit the 
outer parentheses. Thus thanks to the binding order we can rewrite the formula 
(Vy('lx((p(x) /\. (-,r(y)))-+ ((-,q(x)) V (A v B))))) 
as 
(Vy('lx(p(x)/\.--.r(y)-+ --.q(x) v (AVB)))) 
which thanks to the convention of the association to the right further simplifies to 
Vy\fx(p(x)/\.--.r(y)-+ q(x)VAVB). 
This completes the definition of a first order language. 
2.2. Logic programs 
To bar an easy access to newcomers every scientific domain has introduced its own terminology and 
notation. Logic programming is no exception in this matter. Thus an atom or its negation is called a 
literal. A positive literal is just an atom while a negative literal is the negation of an atom. Note that 
true and false are not atoms. 
In turn, a formula of the form 
'Vx1 ... 'Vxs(L1 V · · · V L,,.) 
where x., ... ,x8 are all the variables occurring in the literals Li. ... ,L,,. is called a clause. From now on 
clauses will be always written in a special form called - yes, you guessed it - a clausal form. The above 
formula in a clausal form is written as 
A i. ... ,Ak ~ BJ> ... ,Bn 
where A i. ... ,Ak is the list of all positive literals among LI>····L,,., called conclusions and Bi, ... ,Bn is 
the list of remaining literals stripped of the negation symbol, called premises. Informally, it is to be 
understood as: (A 1 or ... or Ak) if (B 1 and ... and Bn). Thus for example the formula 
'Vx'Vy(p(x) V ~ V --.q(y)VB) 
looks in clausal form as 
p(x),B ~ A,q(y). 
Ha clause has only one conclusion (k = 1), then it is called a program clause or a de.finite clause. Its 
conclusion is then usually called a head and the list of its premises a body. When the set of premises 
of a program clause is empty (n =O), then we talk of a unit clause. They have the form A ~.When 
the set of conclusions is empty (k =O), then we talk of a goal or a negative clause. They have the 
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form 4'-B 1,. •• ,Bn. Finally, when both the set of premises and conclusions is empty then we talk of the 
' empty clause and denote it by D. It is interpreted as a contradiction. 
To understand this interpretation we are in fact brought to the question of meaning of a formula 
L 1 v ... v L,,, when m = 0, i.e. of the empty disjunction. Now, the empty disjunction is considered as 
always false because it asks for an existence of a true disjunct when none of them exists. In contrast, 
the empty conjunction is considered as always true because it asks for truth of all conjuncts, which 
holds when none of them exists. 
Now, we can define a logic program (or just a program) - it is a finite non-empty set of program 
clauses. 
Logic programs form a subclass of general logic programs. To define the general programs we first 
introduce the concept of a general clause. It is a construct of the form 
A 11 ••• ,Ak <f.- Li, ... ,L,, 
where A i. ... ,Ak are positive literals and Li, ... ,L,, are (not necessarily positive) literals. When there is 
only one conclusion (k = 1), we talk of a general program clause, and when the set of conclusions is 
empty (k =O) we talk of a general goal. 
A general clause A 1, •.• ,Ak <f-- Li. ... ,L,, represents the formula 
'1x1 ... 'ifxs(A1V ... VAkV...,L1 V ... V -,£,,). 
where x i. ... ,X3 are all the variables appearing in A i. ... ,Ak,L 1, ••• ,L,,. 
Now, a general logic program (or just a general program) is a finite non-empty set of general pro-
gram clauses. 
Due to the lack of space we do not discuss in this paper the general programs. However, in 
Chapter 6 we study general goals. This provides a first step towards an analysis of general programs. 
Note that true and false are not used to define (general) programs. These formulas will be however 
needed later, in Section 5.5. Formulas of the form 'ifx 1 ... 'ifxsF (s;;ioO) where Fis quantifier-free are 
usually called universal formulas. Thus each clause is a universal formula. 
With each program P we can uniquely associate a first order language Lp whose constants, func-
tions and relations are those occurring in P. All considerations concerning a program P refer to the 
language Lp. In particular, in statements like "Let P be a program and N a goal" N is always 
assumed to be a goal from Lp. 
There are two ways of interpreting a clause A <f--B 1, .. .,Bn· One is: to solve A solve B; for 
i = 1,. . .,n. The other is: A is true if B 1,. • .,Bn are true. The first interpretation is usually called pro-
cedural interpretation whereas the second is called declarative interpretation. It is this first interpreta-
tion which distinguishes logic programming from first order logic. We shall discuss this double 
interpretation in more detail at the end of Chapter 3. 
2.3. Substitutions 
Consider now a fixed first order language. In logic programming variables are assigned values by 
means of a special type of substitutions, called "most general unifiers". Formally, a substitution is a 
finite mapping from variables to terms, and is written as 
fJ = {x1ft1,. . .,Xnltn}· 
Informally, it is to be read: the variables x1,. . .,Xn become (or are bound to) t 1,. .. ,tn, respectively. 
The notation implies that the variables x 1,. •• ,xn are different. We also assume that for 
i = l,. . .,n x; iJl=t;. If t 1 ,. • .,tn are different variables then (J is called a renaming. A pair x;f t; is called a 
binding. If all t 1,. . ., tn are variable-free then fJ is called ground. 
Substitutions operate on expressions. By an expression we mean a term, a sequence of literals or a 
clause and denote it by E. For an expression E and a substitution (), EO stands for the result of 
applying fJ to E which is obtained by simultaneously replacing each occurrence in E of the variable 
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from the domain of () by the corresponding term. The resulting expression E (J is called an instance of 
· E. An instance is variable-free or ground if it contains no variables. If () is a renaming defined on all 
variables of an expression Ethen E() is called a variant of E. 
Given a program P we denote by ground (P) the set of all ground instances of clauses in P. Note 
that this set can be infinite. 
Substitutions can be composed. Given substitutions () = (x 1/t 1, ••• ,xn1tn} and 
TJ = {Y 11si.···•Ym1sm} their composition ffq is defined by removing from the set 
{ X I lti T/,. .. ,Xnl ln1J, YI/ S 1, ... ,yml Sm} 
those pairs x;lt;T/ for which x1=t;TJ, as well as those pairsy/s; for whichy;E{X1>···•xn}· 
Thus for example when (J = (x/3,y!x+l} and 71 = {x/4} then ffq = {x/3,y/4+1}. This 
definition implies the following simple result. 
LEMMA 2.1. For all substitutions 0, 1J and y and an expression E 
i) (EO}ri = E(ffq) 
ii) (Or,)y = O(m). D 
This lemma shows that when writing a sequence of substitutions, also in the context of an expres-
sion, the parentheses can be omitted. By convention substitution binds stronger than any connective 
or quantifier. 
We say that a substitution fJ is more general than a substitution T/ if for some substitution y we have 
TJ = Oy. 
2.4. Unifiers 
Finally, we introduce the notion of unification. Consider two atoms A and B. If for a substitution 0 
we have AO= BO, then 0 is called a unifier of A and Band we then say that A and Bare unifiable. A 
unifier 0 of A and B is called a most general unifier (or mgu in short) if it is more general than any 
other unifier of A and B. It is an important fact that if two atoms are unifiable then they have a most 
general unifier. In fact, we have the following theorem due to ROBINSON [Ro]. 
THEOREM 2.2. (Unification Theorem) There exists an algorithm (called a unification algorithm) which 
for any two atoms produces their most general unifier if they are unifiable and otherwise reports non-
existence of a unifier. 
PROOF. We follow here the presentation of LASSEZ, MAHER and MA.Rruorr [LMM]. We present an 
algorithm based upon Herbrand's original algorithm (HERBRAND [He] p. 148) which deals with solu-
tions of finite sets of term equations. 1bis algorithm is also presented in MARTELLI and MONTANARI 
[MM]. 
Two atoms can unify only if they have the same relation symbol. With two atoms p(s 1, ••• ,sn) and 
p(t1,. .. ,tn) to be unified we associate a set of equations 
{s1 = ti, .. .,sn = t11 }. 
A substitution 0 such that s 18=t 10, ... ,snO=t,.O is called a unifier of the set of equations 
{s1 = t1, ••. ,s,. = tn}· Thus the set of equations {s1 = t 1, •.• ,s,. = t11 } has the same unifiers as the 
atoms p(si. ... ,s,.) and p(t 1,. • .,t11 ). Two sets of equations are called equivalent if they have the same 
unifiers. 
A (possibly empty) set of equations is called solved if it is of the form {x 1 = Uj, ••• ,xn = u11 } where 
x;'s are distinct variables and none of them occurs in a term uj. 
A solved set of equations {x 1 = u1, ••• ,x,. = un} determines the substitution (x 11ui. .. .,xnlu,,}. This 
substitution is a unifier of this set of equations and clearly it is its mgu, that is it is more general than 
any other unifier of this set of equations. 
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Thus to find an mgu of two atoms it suffices to transform the associated set of equations into an 
· equivalent one which is solved. 
The following algorithm does it if this is possible and otherwise halts with failure. 
Unification algorithm 
Non-deterministically choose from the set of equations an equation of a form below and perform the 
associated action. 
(1) f (si, ... ,sn) = f (ti. ... ,tn) replace by the equations s1 = ti.···•Sn = tn 
(2) f(si. ... ,sn) = g(ti. ... ,tm) whereff!/Sg 
halt with failure 
(3) x = x delete the equation 
( 4) t = x where t is not a variable 
replace by the equation x = t 
(5) x = t where x ;;tst and x has another occurrence in the set of equations 
if x appears in t then halt with failure 
otherwise perform the substitution { x It} 
in every other equation 
The algorithm terminates when no step can be performed or when failure arises. To keep the for-
mulation of the algorithm concise we identified here constants with 0-ary functions. Thus step (1) 
includes the case c = c for every constant c which leads to deletion of such an equation. Also step (2) 
includes the case of two constants. 
First. observe that for each variable x step (5) can be performed at most once, so this step can be 
performed only a finite number of times. Subsequent applications (if any) of steps (1) and (4) strictly 
diminish the total number of occurrences of function symbols on the left hand side of the equations. 
Th.is number is not affected by the application of step (3). Moreover, in the absence of step (1), step 
(3) can be performed only finitely many times. This implies termination. 
Next. observe that applications of steps (1), (3) and (4) replace a set of equations by an equivalent 
one. The same holds in the case of a successful application of step (5) because for any substitution 8, 
x8=t8 implies that the substitutions() and {xlt}O are identical. 
Next. observe that if the algorithm successfully terminates, then by virtue of steps (1), (2) and (4) 
the left hand sides of the final equations are variables. Moreover, by virtue of step (5) these variables 
are distinct and none of them occurs on the right hand side of an equation. So if the algorithm suc-
cessfully terminates it produces a solved set of equations equivalent with the original one. 
Finally. observe that if the algorithm halts with failure then the set of equations at the failure step 
does not have a unifier. 
This establiShes correctness of the algorithm and concludes the proof of the theorem. D 
To illustrate the operation of the above unification algorithm consider the following example. 
ExAMPLE 2.3 (LAssEz, MAHER. MARR.Ion [LMM]). Consider the following set of equations 
{f (x) = f (j(z)), g(a,y) = g(a,x)}. 
Choosing the first equation step (I) applies and produces the new equation set 
{x = f (z}, g(a,y} = g(a,x)}. 
Choosing the second equation step (1) applies and yields 
{x = f(z}, a = a, y = x}. 
, Now by applying step (1) again we get 
{x = j(z), y = x}. 
The only step which can be now applied is step (5). We get 
{x = f(z), y = f (z)}. 
Now no step can be applied and the algorithm successfully terminates. O 
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Call a substitution 8 idempotent if 88 = 8. At the end of Chapter 5 we shall need the following 
observation. 
COROLLARY 2.4. If two atoms are unifiable then they have an mgu which is idempotent. 
PRooF. The unifier produced by the procedure used in the proof of the above theorem is of the form 
{ x 1Iu1,. . .,Xn I Un} where none of the variables x; occurs in a term u1, so it is idempotent. 0 
2.5. Computation process - the SW-resolution 
Logic programs compute through a combination of two mechanisms - replacement and unification. 
This form of computing boils down to a specific form of theorem proving, called a resolution. To 
better understand this computation process let us concentrate fust on the issue of a replacement in 
the absence of variables. 
Consider for a moment a logic program P in which all clauses are ground. Let 
N = +- A I>··. ,An (n ~ 1) be a ground negative clause and suppose that for some i, I :E;;; i :E;;; n, 
C = A; +- B 1, .. .,Bk (k ;;;i!:O) is a clause from P. Then 
is the result of replacing Ai in N by B 1,. •. , Bk and is called a resolvent of N and C. A; is called the 
selected atom of N. 
Iterating this replacement process we obtain a sequence of resolvents which is called a derivation. A 
derivation can be finite or infinite. If its last clause is empty then we speak of a refutation of the origi-
nal negative clause N. We can then say that from the assumption that in presence of the program P 
the clause N = ~A 1, •• .,Ak holds we derived the contradiction, namely the empty clause. This can be 
viewed as a proof of the negation of N from P. 
Assuming for a moment from the reader knowledge of semantics for the first order logic (which is 
explained in Section 3.1) we note that N stands for -.A 1 v ... v -,Aki so its negation stands for 
.....,(-,A 1 v ... v --.Ak) which is semantically equivalent to A 1 A .•• AAk. Thus a refutation of N can be 
viewed as a proof of A 1 A ... Mk. 
If we reverse the arrows in clauses we can view a program with all clauses ground as a context-free 
grammar with erasing rules (i.e. rules producing the empty string) and with no start or terminal sym-
bols. Then a refutation of a goal can be viewed as a derivation of the empty string from the word 
represented by the goal. 
An important aspect of logic programs is that they can be used not only to refute but also to com-
pute - through a repeated use of unification which produces assignments of values to variables. We 
now explain this process by extending the previous situation to the case of logic programs and nega-
tive clauses which can contain variables. 
Let P be a logic program and N = -E--A 1, .•• ,An be a negative clause. We fust redefine the concept 
of a resolvent. Suppose that C =A +.-B 1,. • .,Bk is a clause from P. If for some i, 1 ..;; i ..;; n, A; and 
A unify with an mgu 8, then we call 
N' = +-(A1,. . .,A;-i.B1,. .. ,Bk,A;+1>··.,An)8 
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a resolvent of N and C. Thus a resolvent is obtained by performing the following four steps: 
· a) select an atom A;, 
b) unify (if possible) A and A;, 
c) if b) succeeds then perform the replacement of A; by Bi. ... ,Bk in N, 
d) apply to the resulting clause the mgu IJ obtained in b ). 
As before, iterating this process of computing a resolvent we obtain a sequence of resolvents called 
a derivation. But now because of the presence of variables we have to be careful. 
By an SW - derivation (we explain the abbreviation SLD in a moment) of P U {N} we mean a 
maximal sequence N = N 0 ,N1'··· of negative clauses together with a sequence C0,C1, ... of variants 
of clauses from Panda sequence (J0 ,(J1 , ••• of substitutions such that for all i = 0, 1, ... 
a) N;+i is a resolvent of N; and C;, 
b) 8; is the mgu mentioned in step d) above, 
c) C; does not have a variable in common with N;. 
The clauses C 0 , C 1 , •.. are called the input clauses of the derivation. When one of the resolven ts N; is 
empty then it is the last negative clause of the derivation. Such a derivation is then called an SLD -
refutation. A finite SW-derivation is called failed if it is not an refutation. 
A new element in this definition is the use of variants that satisfy c) instead of the original clauses. 
The idea is that we do not wish to make the result of the derivation dependent on the choice of vari-
able names. Note for example that p(x) and p(j(y)) unify by means of the mgu binding x to f (y). 
Thus the goal ~p(x) can be refuted from the programp(j(x))~. 
The existence of an SLD - refutation of PU {N} for N = ~A i, ... ,Ak can be viewed as a contrad-
iction. We can then conclude that we proved the negation of N. But N stands for 
'1x 1 ... 'v'x3 (...,A 1 v ... v...,Ak), so its negation stands for -,'tx1 ... 'v'xs(-,A 1 V ... V-"4k) which is semantically 
equivalent (see Section 3.1) to 3x1 ... 3xs(A 1/\. .. /\Ak)- Now, an important point is that the sequence of 
substitutions IJ0 ,IJ1' ... ,IJm performed during the process of the refutation actually provides the bind-
ings for the variables Xi. ••• ,X3 • Thus the existence of an SLD - refutation for PU {N} can be viewed 
as a proof of the formula (A 1 /\ ..• /\Ak)IJ0 ... 1Jm. We justify this statement in Section 3.2. 
The restriction of IJ0 ••. 1Jm to the variables of N is called a computed answer substitution for PU {N}. 
The success set of a program P is the set of ground atoms A in the language of P for which PU {~A} 
has an SW - refutation. 
According to the definition of SW - derivation the following two choices are made in each step of 
constructing a new resolvent: 
a) choice of the selected atom, 
b) choice of the input clause whose conclusion unifies with the selected atom. 
By a selection rule R we now mean a function which, given k~O, selects from a sequence A i, ••• ,An 
an atom Aj, l~j~n. The parameter k is to be interpreted as the depth of the SW-derivation at 
which the selection takes place. The use of the parameter k allows us to select different atoms in a 
resolvent that occurs more than once in the derivation. 
Given a selection rule R we say that an SLD - derivation of P U { N} is via R if all choices of the 
selected atoms in the derivation are performed according to R. That is, if ~ A i, ... ,An is the k-th 
resolvent in an SW-derivation of PU {N} then R(k,A i, ... ,An) is its selected atom. 
Now, SLD stands for Linear resolution with Selection rule for Definite clauses. 
2. 6. An example 
To the reader overwhelmed with such a long sequence of definitions we offer an example which hope-
fully clarifies the introduced concepts. We analyze in it the consequences of the choices in a) and b). 
Consider a simplified version of the 8 - puzzle. Assume a 3 X 3 grid filled with eight moveable tiles. 
Our goal is to rearrange the tiles so that the blank one is the middle. 
We number the fields consecutively as follows: 
9 
I 2 3 
4 5 6 
7 8 9 
and represent each legal move as a movement of the "blank" to an adjacent square. 
First, we define the relation adjacent by providing an exhaustive listing of adjacent squares in as-
cending order: 
adjacent( 1,2)~, adjacent(2, 3)~, ... ,adjacent(8, 9)~, 
adjacent(l,4)~,adjacent(4,7)~, ... ,adjacent(6,9)~ 
and using a rule 
adjacent(x,y)~adjacent(y,x) (symmetry) 
(horizontal adjacency) 
(vertical adjacency) 
(a) 
In total, 24 pairs are adjacent. (A more succinct representation would be possible if addition and sub-
traction functions were available.) 
Then we define an initial configuration by assuming that the blank is initially, say, on square l. 
Thus we have 
configuration(l,ni/)~. 
where the second argument - here nil - denotes the sequence of squares visited. 
Finally, we define a legal move by the rule 
configuration(x,y. ~~adjacent(x,y),configuration(y, e) 
where y. e is a list with heady and tail e written in the usual infix notation. 
As a goal we choose the negative clause 
~configuration( 5, e) 
stating that no sequence of visited squares leads to a situation where square 5 is blank. 
The following represents an SLD - refutation of the goal of length 7. 
~ configuration (5,e) (b) { f/ei}, { x 15,r!y. ei} 
~adjacent (5,y), configuration (y,e1) (a) {ylyi}, {xl5,y 11y} 
~adjacent (y,5), configuration (y,e1) adjacent(4,5) ~. {y/4} 
~configuration (4,11) (b) {y/yt}{F/l!i}, {x/4,f1/y1.l!i} 
~adjacent (4,y1), configuration (r1>8i) (a) {y/y2}, {x/4,y2lyi} 
~adjacent (yi,4), configuration (y1>8i) adjacent (1,4) ~. {y 1/l} 
~ configuration(l,fz) configuration(l,nil) ~. {l!ilnil} 
D 
(b) 
Selected atoms are put in bold. We thus always select the leftmost atom. On the right the input 
clauses and the mgu's are given. Note that at various places variants of the clauses (a) and (b) are 
used. The sequence of mgu's performed binds the variable e to 4.1.nil through the consecutive substitu-
tions { e/ y. ~ } , {y I 4}, { f1 I y I· Iii } , {y 1 I l } , { 8i I nil}. 
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This provides the sequence of squares leading to the final configuration. Thus the refutation of the 
' initial goal is constructive in the sense that it provides the value of e for which the formula 
~configuration (5,e} does not hold. 
Another choice of input clauses can lead to an infinite SLD - derivation. For example here is a 
derivation in which we repeatedly use rule (a): 
~configuration (5,e) (b) {flfi}, {x/5,rly.fali} 
~adjacent (S,y), configuration (y,~) (a) {y/y 1 }, {xl5,y 11y} 
~adjacent (y,5), configuration (y,~) (a) {ylyi}, {xly,y 115} 
~ adjacent (S,y), configuration (Y, f1) 
Also, another choice of a selection rule can lead to an infinite SLD - derivation. For example, a re-
peated choice of the rightmost atom and rule (b) leads to an infinite derivation with the goals continu-
ously increasing its length by 1. 
2. 7. Refutation procedures - SW-trees 
When searching for a refutation of a goal SW-derivations are constructed with the aim of generating 
the empty clause. The totality of these derivations form a search space. One way of organizing this 
search space is by dividing SLD-derivations into categories according to the selection rule used. This 
brings us to the concept of an SLD-tree. 
To this purpose we first explain how from sequences (here SW-derivations) a tree can be con-
structed. Consider a set of possibly infinite sequences W such that no element of W is an extension 
of another element of W. With such a W we can uniquely associate a tree whose nodes are the ele-
ments of these sequences, whose branches are all the sequences in W and in which different nodes 
have different prefixes. We call such a tree a prefix tree constructed from W. 
Let P be a program, N a goal and R a selection rule. Then the SW-tree for PU { N} via R is the 
prefix tree constructed from all SW-derivations of PU {N} via R. Thus the root node in an SLD-
tree for PU { N} is N and every node in this tree is a goal whose descendants are all its resolvents 
with (the variants of) the clauses of P, where the selected atom is chosen according to R. We call an 
SLD-tree successful if it contains the empty clause. 
The SLD-tree for PU {N} via a selection rule R groups all SW-derivations of PU {N} via R. The 
SLD-trees for PU { N} can differ in size and form. 
ExAMPLE 2.5 (APT and v AN EMDEN [A VE]). Let p be the following program: 
1. path(x,z)~ arc(x,y),path(Y,z), 
2. path(x,x)~. 
3. arc(b,C)h 
A possible interpretation of P is as follows: arc(x,y) holds if there is an arc from x toy and path(x,y) 
holds if there is a path from x toy. 
Figures I and 2 show two SLD-trees for PU { ~path(x,c)}. The selected atoms are put in bold, used 
clauses and performed substitutions are indicated. Whenever no confusion could arise we used the ori-
ginal clauses as input clauses. 
*"- path (x,c) 
*"- arc (x,y), path (y,c) 0 
3 {xlb, ylc} 
*"- path (c,c) 
*"- arc (c,y), path (y,c) O 
(no descendant) 
FIGURE l 
*"- path (x,c) 
~!<) 2""{xl<) 
*"- arc (x,y), path (y,c) 0 
;(,.,,, ''') ~!<) 
*"-arc (x,y), arc (y,u), path (u,c) *"- arc (x,c) 
I 3 (xlb} 
(infinite subtree) *"- arc (x,y ), arc (y,c) O 
3 {ylb} 
*"- arc (x,b) 
(no descendant) 
FIGURE2 
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Note that the first tree is finite while the second one is infinite. Both trees contain the empty 
clause. 
2.8. Bibliographic remarks 
Efficient unification algorithms were proposed by PATERSON and WEGMAN [PW] and MARTELLI and 
MONTANARI [MM]. See also the survey on unification by SIEKMANN [Si]. 
SW-resolution is a special case of SL-resolution of KOWALSKI and KUEHNER [KK] and was pro-
posed as a basis for programming in Kow AI.SKI [K]. The name was first used in APT and v AN &.IDEN 
[A VE] where also the notions of a success set and SLD-trees were formally introduced. SLD-trees 
were informally used in Cl.ARK [C] where they were called evaluation trees. 
Selection rule was originally required to be function defined on sequences of atoms. Our relaxation 
follows the suggestion of SHEPHERDSON [She) (see p. 62). 
3. SEMANTICS 
3.1. Semantics for first order logic 
To understand the meaning of a logic program, or a first order formula in general, we now provide 
the definition of semantics due to A. Tarski. Again, our treatment is very brief. More extensive dis-
cussion of this fundamental issue can be found e.g. in MANIN [M] or SHOENFIELD [S]. 
We begin by defining an interpretation. An interpretation I for a first order language L consists of: 
a) a non-empty set D, called the domain or the universe of I, 
b) an assignment for each constant c in L of an element c1 of the domain, 
c) an assignment for each n-ary function/in L of a mapping Ji from Dn to D, 
d) an assignment for each n-ary relation r in L of an n-ary predicate r1 on D, i.e. a subset of Dn. 
Our aim is now to define when a formula of L is true in an interpretation for L. To this purpose we 
first relate terms to elements of the domain. We do this by making use of the notion of a state (or a 
variable assignment). A state (over I) is simply a function assigning to each variable an element of the 
domain of I. 
Given now a state a we extend its domain to all terms, that is we assign to a term t an element a(t1) 
from the domain I proceeding by induction as follows: 
a) for a variable v we define a(v1) as a(v), the result of applying the state a to v, 
b) for a constant c we define a(c1) as c1 (thus a(c1) does not depend on a), 
c) if f(ti, ... ,tn) is a term then we define a(f(t1, ... ,tn)1) as Ji(a(t 11), ••• ,a(tnJ)), the result of applying 
the mapping Ji to the sequence of values associated with the terms ti. ... ,tn. 
Observe that for a ground term t,a(t1) does not depend on a. 
We can now define a semantics of a formula. Given a formula F we define inductively its truth in 
a state a for I, written as I t:0 F, as follows: 
a) if p(t1, ... ,tn) is an atomic formula then 
I 1:0 p(ti, ... ,tn) i.ff (a(t11), ... ,a(tnJ)) E Pb 
that is, if the sequence of values associated with terms ti. ... ,tn belongs to the predicate p1, 
b) J1:0 true, not Jt:0 false, 
c) if F and G are formulas then 
I 1:0 ..,F iff not I t:0 F, 
I t:0 Fv G i.ff I t:0 F or I 1=0 G, 
I 1=0 "rlxF i.ff I l=a[xtdJF for all d E D. 
Here a[xld] for a state a, an element d of the domain of I and a variable x stands for the state which 
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differs from a only on the variable x to which it assigns the element d. 
This allows us already to define truth of clauses. The truth of other formulas is defined by express-
ing the remaining connectives and the quantifier 3 in terms of...,, v and 'V: 
F /\ G as ..,(-.Fv ..,G), 
F~G as ...,FvG, 
F~G as (F--:,G)/\(G~F). (and then using the 
above two definitions) 
3xF as ...,'lr/x-.F. 
Finally, we say that the formula Fis true in the interpretation I, and write I 1= F, when for all states 
a, I t:..,F. Note that D as the empty disjunction is false in every interpretation I. Let now S be a set 
of formulas. We say that an interpretation I is a model for S if every formula from S is true in I. 
When S has a model, we say that it is satisfiable or consistent. Otherwise, we say that it is unsatisfiable 
or inconsistent. When every interpretation is a model for S, we say that Sis valid. Given another set 
of formulas S' we say that S semantically implies S' or S' is a semantic consequence of S, if every 
model of Sis also a model of S'. We write then S 1= S'. S and S' are semantically equivalent if both 
S 1= S' and S' 1= S hold. 
Several simple facts about semantic equivalence and logical consequence can be proved and will be 
used in the sequel. Already in Section 2.5 we used the fact that the following formulas are valid: 
-.'lrlx1 ... 'VxsF +7 3x1 ... 3Xs-iF, 
-.(A J V ... VAn) ~-.A I /\. .. /\-.An, 
...,-,F ~F. 
3.2. Soundness of the SW-resolution 
Given a goal N = <E-Ai, ... ,Ak denote by N- the formula A 1/\. •• /\Ak. Then o- is the empty con-
junction so it is valid. The following lemma is immediate. 
LEMMA 3.1. If N 0 is a resolvent of N and a clause C with an mgu fJ then 
c l=No -+N-e. D 
As a consequence we obtain the following theorem due to CL.ARK [Cl] justifying the statement made 
in Section 2.5. 
THEOREM 3.2. (Soundness of SLD - resolution). Let P be a program and N = <E-A 1, .•. ,Ak a goal. Sup-
pose that there exists an SLD - refutation of PU{N} with the sequence of substitutions fJo, ..• ,fJn. Then 
(A 1 /\. •• /\AkYlo ... (Jn is a semantic consequence of P. 
PRooF. Let N = N 0 , •.• ,Nn+I = D be the SW-refutation in question and let Co, ... ,Cn be its input 
clauses. Applying Lemma 3.1. n + l times we get 
P 1=0--+(A 1 /\ • • • /\Ak)fJO · · · (Jn 
which implies the claim. D 
CoROLLARY 3.3. If there exists an SW - refutation of PU {N} then PU { N} is inconsistent. 0 
ExA.MPLE 3.4. Reconsider now the program P studied in the example in Section 2.6 with the goal 
<E- configuration (5,e). Since we exhibited there an SW - refutation of PU{+- configuration (5,~}, we 
conclude by the above corollary that PU { <E- configuration (5,e)} is inconsistent, that is 
P t:. 3e configuration (5,e). More specifically, by the Soundness Theorem we have 
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, P 1= configuration (5,e)80 ... 07 where 00 , •.. , 81 is the sequence of performed substitutions. As we saw 
before this sequence binds e to 4.1.nil, so we have P 1= configuration (5, 4.1.nil). D 
A natural question arises whether a converse of the above Corollary or of the Soundness Theorem 
can be proved, that is whether certain form of completeness of SLD - resolution can be shown. To 
handle this question we introduce a special class of models of logic programs, called Herbrand 
models. 
3.3. Herbrand models 
Let L be a first order language whose set of constants is not empty. By the Herbrand universe UL for 
L we mean the set of all ground terms of L. By the Herbrand base BL for L we mean the set of all 
ground atoms of L. If L is the first order language associated with a program P (that is L is Lp) then 
we denote UL and BL by Up and Bp, respectively. Now, by a Herbrand interpretation for L we mean 
an interpretation for L such that 
a) its domain is the Herbrand universe UL, 
b) each constant in L is assigned to itself, 
c) if f is an n-ary function in L then it is assigned to the mapping from (UL)n to UL defined by 
assigning the ground termf(tlo····tn) to the sequence tJ, ... ,tn of ground terms, 
d) if r is an n-ary relation in L then it is assigned to a set of ground atoms of L whose relation sym-
bol is r. 
Thus each Herbrand interpretation for L is uniquely determined by a subset I of the Herbrand base 
B L which fixes the assignment of predicates to relation symbols of L by assigning the set 
{(t1> ... ,tn):r(tlo···,tn)El} to the n-ary relation symbol r. In other words, we can identify Herbrand 
interpretations for L with (possibly empty) subsets of the Herbrand base BL. This is what we shall do 
in the sequel. 
To avoid some uninteresting complications we assume from now on that whenever a program P has 
variables then it also has some constants. This guarantees that its Herbrand base and the set ground 
(P) are not empty. The case of programs containing variables but no constants is hardly of interest 
and can be handled by considering its derived version obtained by substituting all variables by some 
fixed constant. 
With this restriction another uninteresting complication arises when a program uses only proposi-
tional symbols. Then its Herbrand universe is empty. To handle this case one can consider a derived 
program which additionally contains a ground atom r(a) for a new relation symbol r or simply drop 
the condition that a domain of an interpretation is non-empty when L is constant-free and function-
free. 
By a Herbrand model for a set S of sentences we mean a Herbrand interpretation which is a model 
for S. The following simple lemma shows that when studying logic programs it suffices to consider 
their Herbrand models. 
LEMMA 3.5. Let S be a set of universal formulas. If S has a model then it has a Herbrand model. 
PROOF. For a model I let IH = {A :A is a ground atom and I 1= A} denote the corresponding Her-
brand interpretation. A simple induction on the length of the formulas shows that I and In satisfy the 
same quantifier-free variable-free formulas. From this the lemma follows. D 
CoROLLARY 3.6. Let P be a program and N a negative clause. If PU { N} is consistent then it has a 
Herbrand model. D 
We conclude this section by introducing two often reoccurring qualifications. A Herbrand model of 
a set of formulas S is the least model of S if it is included in every other Herbrand model of S and it 
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is minimal if no proper subset of it is a Herbrand model of S. The least model is minimal but the con-
verse is not always true. 
3. 4. The immediate consequence operator 
To study Herbrand models of programs, following v AN EMDEN and Kow ALSKI [VEK], we introduce 
the immediate consequence operator Tp mapping Herbrand interpretations to Herbrand interpretations. 
We put for a program P 
A E Tp(I) iff for some atoms B 1, ••• ,Bn 
A ~ B i. ... ,Bn is in ground (P) 
and I I= B 1 /\. ... /\.Bn. 
Alternatively, for a ground atom A 
A E Tp(I) iff for some substitution fJ 
and a clause B~Bi, ... ,Bn of P 
we have A = B(J and I I= (B 1 /\. •• /\.Bn)O. 
In particular, if A~ is in P, then every ground instance AfJ of A is in Tp(I) for every I. The fol-
lowing simple observation from [VEK] relates Herbrands models of P with the operator Tp. 
PROPOSITION 3.7. For a program Panda Herbrand interpretation I, I is a model of P iff Tp(I) c; I. 
PROOF. First note that I is a model of P iff it is a model of ground (P). Now the latter is true iff for 
every clause A~BJ. ... ,Bn in ground (P) I I= B 1 /\. ••• /\.Bn implies I I= A, i.e. A EI. But this is true iff 
Tp(I) !:;; I. D 
When T(I) c; I holds, I is called a pre-fixpoint of T. Thus to study Herbrand models of a program 
P it suffices to study the pre-fixpoints of its immediate consequence operator Tp. This brings us to a 
study of operators and their pre-fixpoints in a general setting. 
3.5. Operators and their fixpoints 
Consider now an arbitrary, but fixed, complete lattice (for the definition see e.g. BIRKHOFF [Bi]) with 
the order relation c;, the least upper bound operator U and the greatest lower bound operator n. To 
keep in mind the subsequent applications to logic programs and their interpretations we denote the 
least element by 0, the largest element by B, and the elements of the lattice by I,J,M. Given a set 
00 00 
A = Un : n = 0, 1,. .. } of elements, we denote UA and nA by u In and n In, respectively. 
n=O n =O 
Sometimes we rather write LJ In and n In. 
n<w n<w 
Consider an operator T on the lattice. T is called monotonic if for all I,J I c; J implies 
T(I) C T(J). T is called finitary if for every infinite sequence 
lo C I1 !:;; ... , 
00 00 
T( u In) k u T(ln) 
n =O n=O 
holds. If T is both monotonic and finitary then it is called continuous. A more often used, equivalent 
definition of continuity is: T is continuous iff for every infinite sequence 
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lo ~ 11 ~ ... , 
00 00 
T( u In) = u T(Jn) 
n=O n=O 
holds. 
As already mentioned in the previous section any I such that T(l) ~ I is called a pre-fixpoint of T. 
If T(J) =I then I is called afixpoint of T and if T(l) ;;;;) I then I is called a post-fixpoint of T. 
We have the following classical theorem. 
THEOREM 3.8. (Fix.point Theorem) (KNASTER and TARSKI [Ta]). A monotonic operator T has a least 
fixpoint lfp (T) which is also its least pre-fixpoint. D 
We now define powers of a monotonic operator T. We put 
Tto(J) =I, 
Tf(n + IXJ) = T(Tfn(J)), 
Tf"'(I) = LJ Tfn (I) 
n<4'1 
and abbreviate Tfa(0) to Tfa. 
Powers of a monotonic operator generalize in a straightforward way to transfinite powers Tfa(I) 
where a is an arbitrary ordinal. We shall not need them in the sequel. 
The following well known fact holds. 
LEMMA 3.9. If T is continuous, then Tfw is its least pre-fixpoint and its least fixpoint. D 
In the next section we apply these observations to the study of Herbrand models. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we shall also use largest fixpoints and downward powers of monotonic opera-
tors. We put for a monotonic operator T 
T,!.0(1) = I, 
T,!.(n + IXJ) = T(T,!.n(I)), 
T,!.w(I) = n T,!.n(I). 
n<o> 
Downward powers generalize in a straightforward way to transfinite downward powers T ,!.a(J) where 
a is an arbitrary ordinal. We abbreviate T,!.a(B) to T,!.a. 
Note that 
Tfn(I) ~ Tj(n + 1)(1) 
does not necessarily hold but by monotonicity for all n ~O 
Tfn ~ Tj(n + 1) 
does hold. Analogous statement holds for the downward powers. 
The dual theorem to the Fix.point Theorem 3.8 is 
THEOREM 3.10. A monotonic operator T has a greatest fixpoint gfp(T) which is also its greatest post-
fixpoint. D 
A monotonic operator T is called downward continuous if for every infinite sequence 
lo ;;;;) 11 ;;;;) ... , 
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00 00 
T( n In) = n T(In) 
n =O n==O 
holds. 
We have the following well known lemma. 
LEMMA 3.11. Let T be a monotonic operator. Then for every a we have TJ,ot;Jgfp(T). Moreover, for 
some a, TJ.ot = gfp(T). IfT is downward continuous then this ordinal is ~w. D 
We denote the smallest ordinal a for which TJ,a = gfp(T) by llTJ,11 and call it the downward closure 
ordinal of T or the closure ordinal of T J.. · 
3.6. Least Herbrand models 
Let us first investigate the properties of the immediate consequence operator. 
LEMMA 3.12. Let P be a program. Then 
i) Tp is finitary. 
ii) Tp is monotonic. 
PROOF. 
i) Consider an infinite sequence 
lo ~ 11 ~ ... 
of Herbrand interpretations and suppose that 
00 
A E Tp(LJln)· 
n=O 
Then for some atoms B 1,. .. ,Bk 
00 
A~B 1 ,. .. ,Bk is in ground (P), and moreover LJ1nt=B 1 A ···/\Bk. But the latter implies that for 
n=O 
some In, namely the one containing all B i, .. .,Bk, 
lnl=B1/\ ... /\Bk. So A ETp(ln)· 
ii) Immediate by definition. D 
As an immediate consequence of the above lemma we have: 
THEOREM 3.13. (Characterization Theorem) (VAN EMDEN and KOWALSKI [VEK]) Let P be a program. 
Then P has a least Herbrand model Mp which satisfies the following properties: 
i) Mp equals the intersection of all Herbrand models of P. 
ii) Mp is the least pre-fix.point of Tp. 
iii) Mp is the least fix.point of Tp. 
iv) Mp = Tptw. 
PROOF. It suffices to apply Theorem 3.8 and Lemma 3.9. D 
COROLLARY 3.14. The success set of a program P is contained in its least Herbrand model. 
PROOF. By Corollary 3.3 and the above theorem. D 
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3. 7. Completeness of the SLD - resolution 
We can now return to the problem of completeness. 
We first prove the converse of Corollary 3.3 that is the following result due to HILL [H]. The proof is 
due to APT and VAN EMDEN [A VE). 
THEOREM 3.15 (Completeness of SLD - resolution) Let P be a program and N a goal. Suppose PU { N} 
is inconsistent. Then there exists an SLD refutation of PU {N}. 
First we need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 3.16 (Substitution lemma) Let P be a progr~ N a goal and 8 a substitution. Suppose that there 
exists an SLD - refutation of PU {NO}. Then there exists an SLD - refutation of PU { N}. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on the length n of the refutation of PU {NO}. We can assume that 0 
does not act on any of the variables of P. Let N = ~A 1'····Ak· 
If n = 1 then k = 1 and A 10 unifies with a head of a unit clause of P. So A 1 unifies with the head of 
the same clause. This settles the claim. 
If n > 1 then consider the first input clause B0~Bi. ... ,Bm of the refutation. For an mgu 11 we have 
A;O.,, = Bo11 where A;O is the selected atom of NO. Thus by the assumption on 8 A;O.,, = B09q, so A; 
and B0 unify. For some mgu ~and a substitution a we have 0.,, = ea. 
By the assumption on PU {NO} and 0 there exists an SLD - refutation of 
PU{ ~(A 10, ... ,A;-10,B18, ... ,Bm8,A;+18, ... ,AkO)'q} 
of length n - 1. By the induction hypothesis there exists an SLD - refutation of 
PU {+-(A i. ... ,A;-i.Bi. ... ,Bm,A;+i.···•Ak~· 
Consider now an SLD - derivation of PU {N} in which the first selected atom is A; and the first 
input clause is B0+-Bi, ... ,Bm with the mgu ~- Its first resolvent is 
~<A h···•A;-i.Bi. ... ,Bm,Ai+h···•Ak~ which by the above settles the claim. 0 
We now establish the converse of Corollary 3.14. 
LEMMA 3.17. The least Herbrand model of a program P is contained in the success set of P. 
PROOF. We make use of the continuity of the immediate consequence operator T which provides an 
internal structure to Mp. 
Suppose A e Mp. By the Characterization Theorem 3.13 iv) for some k > 0, A e Tpfk. We now 
prove by induction on k that there exists an SLD - refutation of PU {~A}. For k = 1 the claim is 
obvious. 
If k > 1, then for some ground atoms Bi. ... ,Bn the clause A ~ Bi. ... ,Bn is in ground (P) and 
{Bi. ... ,Bn} !;;;; Tpf(k-1). By the induction hypothesis, for i = l, ... ,n there exists an SLD - refutation 
of PU { +-B;}. But all B; are ground so there exists an SLD - refutation of PU { +-Bi. ... ,Bn}· 
Consider now an SLD - derivation of PU {~A } with the first input clause being the one of which 
A~Bi. ... ,Bn is a ground instance. Its first resolvent is a negative clause of which ~Bi. ... ,Bn is a 
ground instance. The claim now follows by Lemm.a 3.16. 0 
We are now in position to prove the Completeness Theorem. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 3.15. Suppose that N = ~A i.···•An. Mp is not a model of PU {N} so N is not 
true in Mp. Thus for some substitution 0 (A 18, ... ,A,,0} !;;;; Mp. By Lemma 3.17, for i = 1, ... ,n there 
exists an SLD - refutation of PU { ~A;O}. But all A;O are ground so there exists an SLD - refutation 
of PU {NO} and the claim now follows by Lemma 3.16. 0 
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3.8. Correct answer substitutions 
The completeness theorem can be generalized in various ways. We provide here two such generaliza-
tions. 
First we introduce the following notions. Let P be a program and N = ~A i. ... ,An a goal. We say 
that 0 is a correct answer substitution for P U { N} if 0 acts only on variables appearing in N and 
P l=(A 1 /\. •. AAn)8 holds. 
Note that if fJ is a correct answer substitution for PU {N} then for ally, PU {N8y} is inconsistent. 
Consequently, PU { N} is inconsistent as it is equivalent to a weaker statement that for some 
y PU {Ny} is inconsistent. 
The following theorem is a kind of converse of the Soundness Theorem 3.2. 
THEOREM 3.18 (CLARK [Cl]). Consider a program Panda goal N. For every correct answer substitution 
0 for P U { N} there exists a computed answer substitution for P U { N} which is more general than fJ. 
We present here the proof due to LLOYD [L]. First we need the following strengthening of the Sub-
stitution lemma. 
LEMMA 3.19 (Lifting lemma). Let P be a program, N a goal and fJ a substitution. Suppose that there 
exists an SLD - refutation of PU {NO} with the sequence of mgu.'s 80, ... , 8n. Then there exists an SLD 
- refutation of PU{N} with the sequence of mgu's 8'o, ... ,8'n such that 8'0 ••• fJ'n is more general than 
890 ... fJn. 
PROOF. By a straightforward refinement of the proof of the Substitution lemma 3.16. D 
LEMMA 3.20. Let P be a program and N a goal. Suppose that fJ is a co"ect answer substitution for 
PU {N}. Then the empty substitution is a computed answer substitution/or PU {NfJ}. 
PROOF. Let xi. ... ,Xn be the variables of NO. Enrich the language of P by adding new constants 
ai. ... ,an and let y be the substitution {x 11ai. ... ,xn1an}· PU {N8y} is inconsistent so by the Com-
pleteness Theorem 3.15 there exists an SLD - refutation of P U { N 8y}. We can assume that the vari-
ables xl> .• .,xn do not appear in the clauses used in this refutation. But N(Jy is ground so the answer 
substitution computed by this refutation is the empty substitution. By textually replacing in this refu-
tation a; by x;, for i = l, ... ,n, we obtain an SLD - refutation of PU {NIJ} with the empty substitution 
as the computed answer substitution. D 
We are now ready to prove the desired theorem. 
PROOF OF nmoREM 3.18. By the above lemma there exists an SLD - refutation of P U { N 8} with the 
empty substitution as the computed answer substitution. Let 00, .•• , On be its sequence of mgu.'s. By 
the Lifting lemma 3.19 there exists an SLD - refutation of PU {N} with the sequence of mgu's 
8'o, ... ,IJ'n such that 8'o ... 8'n is more general than OOo ... fJn. 
Let ylN denote restriction of the substitution y the variables of N. Then 8'0 ••• 8'n IN is more general 
than 960 .•• 0n IN. But the former is the computed answer substitution of the SLD - refutation of 
P U { N} whereas the latter equals 81 N. D 
20 
3.9. Strong completeness of the SLD - resolution 
Another way to generalize the Completeness Theorem is by taking selection rules into account. We 
follow here the presentation of APT and VAN EMDEN [A VE]. 
THEOREM 3.21. (Strong completeness of SW-resolution) (HILL [HJ). Let P be a program and N a 
goal. Suppose that PU {N} is inconsistent. Then every SLD-tree with N as root is successful. 
This theorem states that if P U { N} is inconsistent then there exists an SLD - refutation of P U { N} 
via every selection rule. 
To prove it we first introduce the following notion: Given a program P we call a goal N k-refutable, 
k ~ 1, if in every SLD-tree with N as root there exists the empty clause with a path length from the 
root of at most k. 
Another straightforward refinement of the proof of Substitution lemma yields the following. 
LEMMA 3.22. Let P be a program, Na goal and IJ a substitution. Suppose that NIJ is k-refutable. Then N 
is k-refutable. 0 
Next two lemmata generalize corresponding facts about refuted goals. 
LEMMA 3.23. Let P be a program and let F1,. • .,Fn be sequences of atoms. Assume that Fi. .. .,Fn have no 
variables in common. If each ~F; is k; - refutable for i = 1, ... ,n then ~F1,. .. ,Fn is k, + ... +kn - refut-
able. 
PROOF. By straightforward induction on k 1 + ... +kn. 0 
LEMMA 3.24. If A is in the least model of P, then for some k ~A is k - refutable. 
PROOF. By repeating the argument from the proof of Lemma 3.17 using the above lemma with each 
F; being a single ground atom. 0 
We can now prove the strong completeness of SLD - resolution. 
PROOF OF 'THEOREM 3.21. By repeating the argument from the proof of the Completeness Theorem 
3.15 using Lemmas 3.24, 3.23 and 3.22. D 
Summarizing the results obtained in Sections 3.4, 3.6, 3.7 and the present one we obtain the follow-
ing characterizations of the success set. 
THEOREM 3.25. (Success Theorem) Consider a program P and a ground atom A. Then the following are 
equivalent: 
(a) A is in the success set of P. 
(b) A ETpf(<). 
(c) Every SLD-tree with ~A as root is successful. 
(d) P l=A. 
PRooF. First note that by Corollary 3.6 and the Characterization Theorem 3.13 i) 
P I= A iff A E Mp. 
The rest follows by the Characterization Theorem 3.13 iv), Corollary 3.14, Lemma 3.17 and Lemma 
3.24. 0 
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~e strong completeness theorem shows that when searching for a refutation of a goal any SLD-
tree is a complete search space. Of course whether a refutation will be actually found in a successful 
SLD-tree depends on the tree search algorithm used. 
Note that in fact we proved more. 
THEOREM 3.26. Let P be a program and N a goal. If P U { N} is inconsistent then for some k N is k -
refutable. 
PROOF. By inspection of the proof of the Strong Completeness Theorem 3.21. D 
This indicates that given a program P when searching for a refutation of a goal N it is enough to 
explore any SLD-tree till a certain depth depending only on N. However, this depth as a function of 
the goal N is in general not computable. This is an immediate consequence of the results proved in 
the next chapter. 
3.10. Procedural versus declarative interpretation 
In the last two chapters we studied two ways of interpretating the logic programs. They are sometimes 
ref erred to as a procedural and declarative interpretation. 
Procedural interpretation explains how the programs compute, i.e. what is the computational 
mechanism which underlies the program execution. In the framework of programming languages 
semantics it is sometimes referred to as the operational semantics. 
On the other hand, declarative interpretation provides the meaning of a program, that is it attempts 
to answer the question what semantically follows from the program without analyzing the underlying 
computational mechanism. In such a way declarative interpretation provides a specification for any 
underlying computational mechanism, i.e. it explains what should be computed by the program. In the 
framework of programming language semantics it corresponds with the denotational semantics. 
To summarize the above we can say that procedural interpretation is concerned with the method 
whereas declarative interpretation is concerned with the meaning. Any form of a completeness 
theorem can be viewed as a proof of a match between these two interpretations. In practice of course 
this match can be destroyed when, as explained at the end of the previous section, the computational 
mechanism is supplemented by an incomplete (tree) search algorithm. 
3.11. Bibliographic remarks 
The name immediate consequence operator was introduced in CL.ARK [Cl]. GALLIBR [G] presents a 
different proof of the completeness of the SLD - resolution based on the use of Gentzen systems. The 
strongest completeness result is that of CLARK [Cl] which combines the claims of Theorems 3.18 and 
3.21. LLOYD [L] provides a rigorous proof of this theorem. 
4. COMPUTABILITY 
4.1. Computability versus de.finability 
Once we defined how logic programs compute and analyzed the relation between the proof theoretic 
and semantic aspects, let us reflect on the question what objects logic programs compute. We show 
here that logic programs are computationally complete in the sense that they have the same computa-
tional power as recursive functions. 
Assume that the language L has at least one constant, so that the Herbrand universe UL is not 
empty. Moreover, assume that L has infinitely many relation symbols in every arity. We say that a 
program P computes a predicate R <;, U'l using a relation r if for all tl>···•tn E UL 
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(ti, ... ,tn)ER iff there exists an SW-refutation of PU { ~ r(ti, ... ,tn)}· 
A semantic counterpart of this definition is obtained by saying that a program P defines a predicate 
R ~ U'l using a relation r if for all It ,. .. ,tn e Ui 
(ti, ... ,tn)ER iff P I= r(tl>···•tn). 
Both definitions presuppose that Lp ~Land UL, = Ui. We have the following result. 
THEOREM 4.1. Let P be a program. R a predicate and r a relation. Then the following are equivalent: 
(a) P computes R using r. 
(b) P defines R using r. 
(c) For all ti. ... ,tnEUL 
(t1, ... ,tn)ER iff r(ti. ... ,tn)EMp. 
PROOF. By the Success Theorem 3.25 and the Characterization Theorem 3.13. 0 
Thus the question which predicates are computed by logic programs reduces to the question which 
predicates are defined over their least Herbrand models. 
This question has various answers depending on the form of L. We study here the case when L has 
finitely many but at least one constant and finitely many but at least one function symbol. Then the 
Herbrand universe Ui is infinite. The assumption that the set of constants and the set of functions are 
finite allows us to reverse the question and analyze for a given program P which predicates it com-
putes over its Herbrand universe UL,· The assumption that in each arity the set of relations is infinite 
allows us to construct new clauses without syntactic constraints. 
4.2. Enumerability of UL 
We call a binary predicate Ron UL an enumeration of UL if R defines the successor function on Ui. 
In other words, R is an enumeration of UL if we have UL = {fk(u):n <"'} where u is some fixed 
ground term and fR is a one-one function defined by fR (x) = y iff (x,y) eR. 
As a first step towards a characterization of predicates computable by logic programs we prove the 
following result due to ANDREKA and NBMETI [AN]. Our presentation is based on BLAIR [B2]. 
THEOREM 4.2. (Enumeration Theorem) There exists a program successor which computes an enumera-
tion of Ui using a binary relation succ. 
PROOF. The construction of the program successor is rather tedious. First we define the enumeration 
enum of UL which will be computed. 
We start by defining inductively the notion of height of a ground term. We put 
height(a) = 0 for each constant a, 
height(f (t1,. .. ,tn)) = max(height(t1), ... ,height(tn))+ 1. 
Next, we define a well-ordering on all ground terms. To this purpose we first order all constants 
and all function symbols in some way. We extend this ordering inductively to all ground terms of 
height ~n (n > 0) by putting 
f (si. ... ,sk) < g(ti. .. .,tm) iff 
(height(( (s 1'··.,sk),f,s 1,. •• ,sk) -< (height(g(t 1>··.,tm),g,t1 ,. .. ,tm). 
Here -< is a lexicographic ordering obtained from the ordering of natural numbers, ordering of 
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function symbols and the already defined ordering < on ground terms of height <n. This extension 
is compatible with the fragment of < defined so far. By induction < is defined on all ground terms. 
>From the following three observations and the assumption about the number of constants and 
function symbols it follows that < is a well-ordering of type w: 
a) If height(s) < height(t) then s < t. 
b) If height(f (si, ... ,sk)) = height(g(t1> ... ,tm)) and /is smaller than gin the chosen ordering then 
f (si, .. .,sk) < g(ti, .. .,tm). 
c) If height(f(sJ, ... ,sj,S;+i.····sk)) = height(f(s 1, ... ,s;,l;+i, ... ,tk)) and s;+ 1 < t;+ 1 then 
f(s1, ... ,s;,s;+1>····sk) < f(s 1, ••• ,s;,t;+ 1, ••• ,tk). 
We now define enwn to be the graph of the <-successor function. Note that 
d) If t is the <-maximal term of height n then its <-successor is the <-minimal term of height 
n+l. 
e) Otherwise, the <-successor of t = f (t1>···,tn) is obtained by first locating the rightmost term t; 
whose (already defined) <-successor t'; has the height smaller than the height of t. Then 
f(ti. ... ,t;-i,t';,a, ... ,a) is the <-successor oft, where a is the <-least constant. 
To compute the relation enum we systematically translate its definition into clauses. We proceed by 
the following steps. 
l) For counting purposes we identify a subset NL of UL with the set of natural numbers N. Let/0 be 
the smallest function in the chosen ordering. We put 
NL = {n:nEN} 
where 6 = a and for each n, n + 1 = f 0(a, ... ,a,n). 
The following program Nat computes NL using a relation nat: 
nat(a) ~, 
nat(f0(a, ... ,a,x)) ~ nat(x). 
In tum, the program SL obtained by adding to Nat the clause 
sL(x,fo(a, ... ,a,x)) ~ nat(x) 
computes the successor relation on NL using a relation sL· 
2) Using the programs Nat and SL the definition of the height function can now be translated into a 
program height with a binary relation h such that 
heightt= h(t,k) jjf t is a ground term of height n, where k = n. 
3) Note that n is the <-minimal term of height n. Thus adding a clause min(x,x) ~ nat(x) we get a 
program minimum such that 
minimum 'F min(t,k) jjf t is the <-minimal term of height n, where k = n. 
Let now b be the <-largest constant and / 1 the largest function in the chosen ordering. Note that 
the <-maximal term of height 0 is b, of height 1 f 1(b, ... ,b) etc. Thus adding clauses 
max(b,a) ~. 
max(f1(x, ... ,x),y') ~ max(x,y),sL(Y,y') 
we get a program maximum such that 
maximum I= max:(t,k) jjf t is the < - maximal term of height n, where k = n. 
4) Using the above auxiliary definitions the program successor can now be constructed by translating 
the statements d) and e) into clauses. The details are straightforward though lengthy and we omit 
them. 
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This concludes the proof. D 
4.3. Recursive functions 
To characterize the predicates computable by logic programs we need to recall the basic concepts of 
the recursion theory as developed by S.C. Kleene. We follow here SHOENFIBID [S]. 
For brevity denote the sequence ai. ... ,an by a. Let for i = I, ... ,n the projection function Pf be 
defined by 
Pf@) =a;. 
For a given predicate R ~ Nn ,KR stands for its characteristic function defined by 
KR@) = 1 iff a E R 
KR@> = o ur a fi R. 
We define the class of (total) recursive functions over N inductively by putting 
Rl. The functions P7, +, X and K < are recursive. 
R2. If g,h 1, ••• ,hk are recursive functions and f is defined by 
/@) = g(h1@> •... ,hk@)) 
then f is recursive. 
R3. Let g be a recursive function such that 
Vii3b g@,b) = 0. 
Then the function f defined by 
f@) = µb. g@,b) = 0 
is recursive. Here µb. R stands for the least b such that R holds. 
A predicate over N is recursive if its characteristic function is recursive. A predicate R is recursively 
enumerable if for some recursive predicate S 
a e R ur 3b@,b) e s. 
A predicate R is R.E. complete if for every recursively enumerable predicate S 
a E S i.ff f@) E R 
for some recursive function f 
R.E. complete predicates are not recursive. It is a well known fact that there exists a recursively 
enumerable predicate which is R.E. complete. 
In the sequel we shall use various well known simple results from the theory of recursive functions. 
We also rely on some standard techniques like coding. This allows us to investigate the complexity of 
subsets of the Herbrand base B1 as its elements can be coded by natural numbers. 
We have the following simple result. 
'THEOREM 4.3. For every program P, Mp is recursively enumerable. 
PROOF. By the Characterization Theorem 3.13iv) we have A e Mp iff for some relation p and 
ti. ... ,tn E Up, A = p(ti. .. .,tn) and 3k p(ti. .. .,tn)ETptk. 
The result now follows by the standard techniques of the recursion theory because the predicate 
{(k,A): A e Tptk} 
is, after appropriate coding, recursive. D 
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4. 4. Computability of recursive functions 
The Herbrand universe UL does not coincide with natural numbers but thanks to the Enumeration 
Theorem 4.2 we can make such an identification. This allows us to transfer the notions of the recur-
sion theory from N to UL. 
We now prove the following theorem. 
lH:EOREM 4.4. (Computability Theorem) (ANDREKA and NEMETI [AN]) For every recursive function f 
there is a program P which computes the graph off using a relation PJ· 
PROOF. We assume that each program here given incorporates the program successor which uses 
different relations than those used here. We proceed by induction on the construction of recursive 
functions. 
ad RJ. We can define + in terms of the successor by simply rewriting two well known axioms of 
Peano arithmetic as clauses: 
A 
p+(x,O,x) ~. 
P+(x,y,z) ~ succ(y',y),succ(z',z),p+(x,y',z'). 
Other functions admit equally straightforward presentations. 
ad R2. Suppose by induction that there exist programs P0 , ... ,Pk computing the graphs of functions 
g,hi. ... ,hk using the relations Pg•Ph, .... ,ph., correspondingly. We can assume that P0 , ... ,Pk have no 
relations in common apart of those occurring in successor. Then the program P0 U · · · UPk aug-
mented by the clause 
pfx 1, ... ,Xe.Xi+1) ~ Ph, (x 1 .... ,xe,y1), ... ,ph, (x1 , ... ,xe,Jk),pg(y1, .. .,yk>xi+1) 
computes the graph of the function f defined as in R2. 
ad R3. Let f and g be recursive functions as given in R3. By induction there exists a program Pg 
which computes the graph of g using a relation h· 
The program P1 is obtained by adding to Pg the following clauses with a new relation r: 
A 
p/x1,. .. ,Xk>Xk+I) ~ Pg(X1,. .. ,Xk+1>0),r(xi, ... ,Xk+I), 
A 
r(x1, .. .,xk>O) ~, 
,.. 
r(x 1 , ... ,xk>y) ~ succ(y',y),r(x 1 ,. .. ,xk,y'),pg(x J , ... ,xk>y',z),p <(O,z). 
The intended meaning of r(x 1,. •• ,xk+ 1) is: \ty(y <xk+I ~ g(x1> ... ,xby)>O). Note that under this 
interpretation r(x 1,. •. ,xb0) holds and r(x 1, ... ,xk>n + 1) iff r(x1>····xk>n)J\g(xi. ... ,xbn)>O and this is 
exactly what the last two clauses express. D 
COROLLARY 4.5. A predicate Ron UL is recursively enumerable iff some program P computes it using a 
relation r. 
PROOF.=>. Suppose that for some recursive predicate S 
7i E R iff 3b@,b)ES. 
Let Ps be the program computing the characteristic function Ks of S using a relation Ps· Then the 
program Ps augmented by the clause 
A 
PR(Xi, ... ,xk) ~ ps(x1,. .. ,xby,l) 
computes the predicate R using relation PR. 
'*'=· By Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.3. D 
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This allows us to prove the converse of the Computability Theorem. 
COROLLARY 4.6. Suppose that a program P computes the graph of a total function using some relation. 
Then this function is recursive. 
PROOF. A total function is recursive iff its graph is recursively enumerable. 0 
Also, we can obtain the following characterization of the recursion theoretic complexity of Mp. 
CoROLLARY 4.7. For some program P, Mp is R.E. complete. A fortiori Mp is not recursive. 
PROOF. Let R be a recursively enumerable, R.E. complete predicate on UL. By Corollary 4.5 and 
Theorem 4.1 we have for all a E UL 
aeR iff r(a)EMp, 
where Pisa program which computes R using a relation r. This shows that Mp is R.E. complete, as 
well. 0 
We conclude this section by mentioning the following strengthening of the Computability Theorem 
4.4 which we shall use in the next section. Following BLAIR [B2] we call a program P determinate if 
Tptw = Tp!w. 
'THEOREM 4.8. (BLAIR [B2]). For every recursive function f there is a determinate program P which com-
putes the graph off using a relation Pi" 0 
The proof is based on a detailed analysis of the programs constructed in the proof of the Computa-
bility Theorem 4.4 and we omit it. 
4.5. Closure ordinals of Tp! 
In this section we study the downward closure ordinals of the operators Tp for programs P. 
We noted in Section 3.6 that for a program P the operator Tp is continuous. However, Tp does not 
need to be downward continuous. To see this consider the following program P: 
pif (x)) +- p(x), 
q(a) +- p(x). 
Then for n;;a.I we have Tp!n = {q(a)}U{p(/*(a)):k;;a.n}, so Tp!w = {q(a)}. It follows that 
Tp!(w+I) = 0, hence llTP!ll = w+l and Tp is not downward continuous. Note that by Lemma 
3.11 gfp(Tp) = Tp!(w+I) = 0. 
This asymmetry is one of the most curious phenomena in the theory of logic programming. 
To characterize the downward closure ordinals of the operators Tp we first introduce some 
definitions. We shall consider well-founded orderings on natural numbers. For a well-founded order-
ing R we write a<Rb instead of (a,b)eR and denote by dom(R) its domain. 
With each well-founded ordering R we can associate in a standard way an ordinal llR II by means of 
a transfinite induction: 
llall = 0 if a is the <R-least element of dom(R), 
llall = sup(llbll + l:b<Ra) otherwise, 
llRll = sup(llall:a E dom(R)). 
An ordinal a is called recursive if a = llRll for some well-founded ordering R which is a recursive 
predicate. The least non-recursive ordinal is denoted by w~k (w1 of Church and K.leene). 
The following theorem characterizes the ordinals llTp!ll. 
'THEOREM 4.9. (BLAIR [BI]) 
i) For every a~w~k there exists a program P such that 11 Tp!ll = a. 
ii) For every program P 11 Tp!ll o;;;;;w~k. 
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PROOF. i) It is clear how to construct for any natural number n ~O a program P such that 
llTp!ll = n. Suppose now that w~a<w1k. For some f3 we have a= w+/3. 
Assume from now on that L has exactly one, unary, function symbol f and exactly one constant a. 
Then UL coincides with natural numbers. 
Let R be a recursive well-founded ordering such that llR II = /3. Given a relation q we denote by [q] 
the set of all ground atoms of the form q(ti, ... ,tn). 
Let P 1 be the program P from the beginning of this section augmented by the clause 
q(y) - p(x). 
Then Tp 1 tw = [q] and Tp 1 ta = 0 for a>w. 
By Theorem 4.8 there exists a determinate program P 2 which computes R using some relation r. 
We can assume that P 1 and P2 are disjoint. Then for any a~w 
Tp2 J,an[r] = R,, 
where 
Rr = {r(s,t): (s,t)ER}. 
Let P 3 be the program 
q(x) - r(y,x),q(y) 
where q does not appear in P 1 and P 2, and finally let 
P = P1 UP2 UP3. 
Then 
Tptwn([q]U[r]) = [q]UR,. 
Thus 
Tpt(w+ l)n([q]U[r]) = 
= {q(s): s E dom(R),llsll~l}UR, 
and more generally, for every y 
Tpt(w+y)n([q)p U[r)p) = 
{q(s): s E dom(R), llsll~y} URr. 
Thus for y</3 
Tpi(w+y)=rf=Tp!(w+y+ 1). 
Also 
Tp!(w+,B)n([q)pU[r]p) = R,, 
so 
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and consequently 
TpJ.(a+ 1) = TpJ.a, 
i.e. 11 TpJ.11 = a. 
The proof that for some program P in fact llTpJ.11 = w~k and the proof of ii) rely on advanced 
results from the recursion theory and are beyond the scope of this paper. 0 
4.6. Bibliographic remarks 
There is a considerable confusion concerning the actual formulation and origin of the results of the 
first part of this chapter. The statement that logic programming has a full power of recursion theory is 
usually attributed to TAR.NLUND [1] who showed that Turing machines can be simulated using logic 
programs. However, in his proof additional function symbols are used and the paper of ANDREKA and 
NEMETI [AN] actually appeared earlier as a technical report. 
A syntactically stronger form of the Computability Theorem 4.4 in case when L has exactly one, 
unary function symbol and exactly one constant was proved in SEBELIK and STEPANEK [SS]. For such 
L the Computability Theorem 4.4 is implicitly contained in SMULLYAN [Sm]. Related results were 
proved in !TAI and MAKOWSKY [IM], KOWALSKI [K3], SHEPHERDSON [Shel] and SONENBERG and 
TOPOR [S1]. The last paper discusses all these results in detail. BORGER [Bo] discusses connections 
between logic programming and computational complexity of various classes of formulas. 
That Tp does not need to be downward continuous was originally observed by Andreka and 
N emeti, and Clark. 
5. NEGATIVE INFORMATION 
5.1. Non-monotonic reasoning 
SLD resolution is an example of a sound method of reasoning because only true facts can be deduced 
using it. More precisely, we call here a reasoning method "1-" sound if for all variable-free formulas q, 
Pl-q, implies Pt:i>, where Pl-q, denotes that q, can be proved from a program P. And we call "1-" weakly 
sound if P1-rp implies consistency of PU{<f>}. Now, putting (see Section 2.5) Pl-sLD 3x 1 ... 3x5 
(A 1 /\ ... /\Ak) iff there exists an SLD-refutation of PU {~A 1, .. .,Ak }, we see that "1-sw" is sound by 
virtue of Soundness Theorem 3.2. 
We call a reasoning method "1-" effective if for any program P the set { <[>:P1-rp} is recursively enu-
merable. Now, "1-sLD" is easily seen to be effective by using the standard techniques of recursion 
theory. Effectiveness is a desirable property as it amounts to saying that it is decidable whether an 
object is a proof of a formula. ~neff ective reasoning methods cannot be implemented. 
SLD-resolution is also an example of a monotonic method of reasoning. We call here a reasoning 
method "1-" monotonic if for any two programs P and P' 
Pl-q, implies P U P'1-ip. 
Otherwise, "1-" is called non-monotonic. Clearly, if there exists an SLD-refutation of PU {N} then also 
there exists an SLD-refutation of PUP' U { N}. 
However, SLD-resolution is a very restricted form of reasoning, because only positive facts can be 
deduced using it. This restriction cannot be overcome if soundness or monotonicity is to be main-
tained. More precisely, the following simple yet crucial observation holds. 
LEMMA 5.1. Let "I"'" be a reasoning method such that PI "'..,A for some negative ground literal ..,A. 
Then "I,...," is not sound. Moreover, if" I-" is weakly sound then it is not monotonic. 
PROOF. Note that the Herbrand base is a model of P but not a model of ..,A. Thus "1--" is not 
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sound. Suppose it is monotonic. Then we get PU {A} I --.A. But Pu {A} u {-.A} is inconsistent, so 
" I ,..," is not weakly sound. 0 
However, in some applications it is natural to require that also negative information can be 
deduced. 
ExAMPLE 5.2. Consider P = {male(Jerry) ~. fema/e(Jacky) ~}. Then we naturally expect that 
-.female (Jerry) and -,male (Jacky). 0 
By Lemma 5.1 any such extension of SLD-resolution leads to a non-monotonic reasoning. 
5.2. Closed world assumption 
One natural possibility is to consider here the following rule (or rather meta-rule): 
A cannot be proved P 
-.A 
where A is a ground atom. 
1bis rule is usually called the closed world assumption (CW A). It was first considered in REITER {R]. 
The notion of provability referred in the hypothesis is that in the first order logic. For our purposes it 
is sufficient to know that it is equivalent here to provability by means of the SLD-resolution. 
Given now a program P consider the set 
CWA (P) = {-.A :A is a ground atom for which there 
does not exist an SLD - refutqtion of PU { ~ A } }. 
We have 
LEMMA 5.3. -,A e CWA(P) iff A e Bp \Mp. 
PROOF. We have -.A e CWA (P) iff A is not in the success set of P. The claim now follows by Corol-
lary 3.14 and Lemma 3.16. D 
As an immediate consequence we get 
THEOREM 5.4. (RErrmt [R]). For any program P, PUCWA(P) is consistent. 0 
Thus closed world assumption viewed as a reasoning method is weakly sound. Unfortunately, it is 
not an effective reasoning method. Namely, we have the following theorem. 
THEOREM 5.5. Assume that L is as in Chapter 4. Then for some program P the set CWA (P) is not 
recursively enumerable. 
PROOF. By Corollary 4.7 there exists a program P such that Mp is a recursively enumerable but not 
recursive subset of UL. Then by a well known theorem Bp \Mp, the complement of Mp, is not recur-
sively enumerable. 
1bis concludes the proof in view of Lemma 5.3. 0 
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5.3. Negation as failure rule 
A way out of this dilemma is to adopt same more restrictive forms of unprovability. A natural possi-
bility is to consider -.A proved when an attempt to prove A using SW-resolution fails finitely. This 
leads to the following definitions. 
An SW-tree is finitely failed if it is finite and contains no empty clause. Given a program P its 
finite failure set is the set of all ground atoms A such that there exists a finitely failed SLD-tree with 
+-A as root. 
We now replace CWA by the following rule: 
A is in the finite failure set of P 
-.A 
introduced in CLARK [C] and called negation as failure rule. (A more appropriate name would be: 
negation as a finite failure rule.) 
First of all it is useful to note that negation as failure rule viewed as a reasoning method is weakly 
sound. Indeed, if A is in the finite failure set of P then by the strong completeness of SW-resolution 
(Theorem 3.21) -.A is in CWA (P), so it suffices to apply Lemma 5.3. 
Thus by Theorem 5.4 negation as failure is a non-monotonic form of reasoning. It is also an 
effective form of reasoning because it is decidable whether a finite tree is a finitely failed SW-tree. 
Finally, observe that using negation as failure rule we can trivially deduce -,female(Jerry) and 
-.male(Jacky) from the program P given in Example 5.2. 
5.4. Characterizations of finite failure 
We now provide two characterizations of the finite failure, due to APT and VAN EMDEN [A VE] and 
LAssEz and MAHER [LM]. We follow here the presentation of LLOYD [L]. 
First we introduce the concept of a fair .SW-derivation due to LAssEz and MAHER [LM]. An SW-
derivation is called fair if it is either finite or every atom appearing in it is eventually selected. (An 
atom at the moment of selection will be actually an instantiation of the original version.) For exam-
ple, second derivation given in Section 2.6 is not fair as the atom configuration (y, e1) is never selected 
in it. An SW-tree is fair if each of its branches is a fair SW-derivation. 
THEOREM 5.6. Consider a program P and a ground atom A. Then the following are equivalent: 
(a) A is in the finite failure set of P. 
(b) A f£ Tp!'-'>· 
(c) Every fair SLD-tree with +-A as root is finitely failed. 
To prove that (a) implies (b) we need two simple lemmata which are counterparts of Lemmas 3.22 
and 3.23. 
LEMMA 5.7. Consider a program P, a negative clause Nanda substitution fJ. If PU {N} has a finitely 
failed SLD-tree of depth :s;;,.k then so has PU {NfJ}. 
PROOF. By a straightforward induction on k. 0 
LEMMA 5.8. Consider a program P and sequences of atoms F1,. . .,Fn. Assume that Fi. .. .,Fn have no 
variables in common. If PU { +-F1,. . .,Fn} has a finitely failed SW-tree of depth :s;;,.k then so has 
PU {+-F;} for some iE{l, ... ,n}. 
PROOF. By a simple induction on k using an analogous argument as that in the proof of Lemma 3.23. 
0 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6 
(a)~ (b). 
We prove a stronger claim namely: 
LEMMA 5.9. Suppose PU {-A} has a finitely failed SLD-tree of depth ~k. Then A e TpJ,k. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on k. 
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The claim clearly holds when k = 1. Assume it holds for k -1 and suppose by contradiction that 
A E Tp~. Then for some clause B-BJ, ... ,Bn in P A-=130 and {B 18, ... ,Bn0} \;;;Tpt(k -1) for some 
substitution 8. Thus for some mgu y Ay=IJ-y and 0 = -ya for some o. 
Hence -(Bi. ... ,Bn)y is the root of a finitely failed SW-tree of depth ~k-1. By Lemma 5.7 so is 
-(Bi, ... ,Bn)(). Now using Lemma 5.8 with each F; being a single ground atom we get that -Bi8 is 
also the root of a finitely failed SLD-tree of depth -,s;;;,k - l. By the induction hypothesis 
B;O f/. TpJ,(k -1) which gives the contradiction. D 
To prove that (b) implies (c) we need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 5.10. Consider a program P and a goal -A 1, .•• ,A,,,. Suppose there is an infinite fair SLD-
derivation -A !>···•Am = No.NI>· .. with the sequence of substitutions 80 ,0i.···· Then for every k ;;;i. 0 
there exists n ;;;;;.: 0 such that 
m 
LJ [A;Oo ... On] C TpJ,k. 
i=l 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on k. The claim is clearly true k =O. Suppose it holds for k -1. 
Fix i E {l, ... ,m}. By fairness for somep;;;..O ":-A;00 .•• 8p-I is selected in the goal Nr By the induc-
tion hypothesis for some s ;;;.:o 
q 
LJ [BjOr.Op+s]\:TpJ,(k-1) 
j=I 
holds where NP +I is -B 1, ••• ,Bq. But 
q 
[A;li0 ... 0P +s] (;;; Tp( U [B/lr.OP +s]) 
j=I 
so 
[A;00 •.. 0P +s1 (;;; TpJ,k 
by the monotonicity of Tp. 
Thus for each i E {l, ... ,m} there exists n;;;;.:O such that [A;Oo ... On,l\:TpJ,k. Put now 
n = max(nJ. ... ,n,,,) D 
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6 CONTINUED 
(b)~(c). 
Suppose that A f/. TpJ,w. Consider a fair SLD-tree with -A as root. By Lemma 5.10 all of its 
branches are finite. But this tree does not contain the empty clause. Otherwise by the Success 
Theorem 3.25 we would have A E Tp jw C TpJ,w. Thus it is a finitely failed SLD-tree. 
(c)~(a). 
Obvious. D 
Equivalence between (a) and (b) is due to APT and VAN EMDEN [A VE] and between (a) and (c) due 
to LASSEZ and MAHER [LM]. The first equivalence can be seen as a theorem dual to the equivalence 
between (a) and (b) in the Success Theorem 3.25. The second equivalence can be seen as a 
32 
counterpart of the equivalence between (a) and (c) in the Success Theorem 3.25 where duality is 
achieved by restricting the attention to fair SLD-trees. 
5.5. Completion of a program 
Another way of inferring a negative information from a logic program is that using the concept of a 
completion of a program due to CLARK [C]. 
A program can be seen as a collection of statements of the form "if ... then --". This does not 
allow us to conclude negative facts because only positive conclusions are admitted. But treating the 
clauses as statements of the form " ... itf ---" we obtain a stronger interpretation which allows us to 
draw negative conclusions. In doing so we should exercise some care. For example we wish to inter-
pret the program {A~B, A~C} as A~BvC and not as (A~B)A(A~C). 
First, assume that"=" is a new binary relation symbol not appearing in P. We write s=j=.t as an 
abbreviation for -,(s =t). We perform successively the following steps. 
Step I. Remove terms. 
Transform each clausep(t1, ... ,tn)~B1, ... ,Bm of Pinto 
p(x1, ... ,Xn)~(X1 =t1)J\. .. J\(Xn =tn)J\B1 J\ ... J\Bm 
where xl>···•Xn are new variables. 
Step 2. Introduce existential quantifiers. 
Letyi.····Yd be the variables of the original clause. Transform each formulap(xi. ... ,xn)~Finto 
p(x1, ... ,xn)~3y, ... 3ydF. 
Step 3. Group similar formulas. 
Let 
p (x J , •• .,Xn)~F I•··· 
p(x1, ... ,Xn)~Fk 
be all formulas obtained in the previous step with a relation p on the left hand side. Replace them by 
one formula 
p(x1, ... ,xn)~F1 V ... VFk. 
If F 1 v ... v Fk is empty, replace it by true. 
Step 4. Handle "undefined" relation symbols. 
For each n-ary relation symbol q not appearing in a head of a clause in P add a formula 
q (x 1, ••• ,Xn)~ false. 
Step 5. Introduce universal quantifiers. 
Replace each formula p(xi. ... ,xn)~F by 
\:/x1 ... 'Vxi,p(x1, ... ,xn)~F) 
Step 6. Introduce equivalence. 
In each formula replace"~" by"~". 
We call the intermediate form of P obtained after step 5 the IF-definition associated with P and 
denote it by IF(P). We call the final form the !FF-definition associated with P and denote it by 
IFF(P). By ONLY-IF(P) we denote the set of formulas obtained from JF(P) by replacing every-
where"~" by"~". 
ExAMPLE 5.11. 
i) Reconsider the program 
Then 
P = (male(Jerry) ~ ,female(Jacky) ~}. 
IFF(P) = (\fx(male(x)~x =Jerry), 
\fx(female(x) ~ x =Jacky)}. 
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Note that both IFF(P)hmale(Jacky) and IFF(P)hfemale(Jerry) provided we interpret"=" as 
identity. 
ii) Consider the program 
P = {link(a,b) ~. link(b,c) ~. 
connected (x,y) ~ link (x,y ), 
connected(x,y) ~ link(x,z), connected(z,y)}. 
Then 
IFF(P) = (\fx\fy(link(x,y) ~ (x =a /\ y =b) 
v (x =b /\y =c), 
\fx\fy(connected(x,y) ~ link(x,y) 
V3z (link (x,z)/\connected(z,y ))) }. 
Note that both IFF(P)'r:connected(a,c) and IFF(P)F-,connected(a,a) provided we interpret "=" as 
identity. 0 
We thus see that a negative information can be inferred using the !FF-definition provided we inter-
pret the relation symbol "=" properly. To this purpose we extend the interpretation of a first order 
language so that "=" is interpreted as identity. 
Let I be an interpretation of the first order language associated with P. We put for any two terms 
ti and t2 and a state a 
/F0 t 1 =t2 i.ff a(t 11) and a(tu) are the same elements of the domain of I. 
This does not yet solve the problem because even though Jerry and Jacky or a and b are different 
constants, they still can become equal under some interpretation. To exclude such situations we add 
to the JFE-definitions the following/ree equaliry axioms which enforce proper interpretation of "= ". 
(1) j(x1,. .. ,Xn)=/(y1,. . .,yn) ~ Xt =y1/\. .. /\Xn = Yn 
for each function f, 
(2) f(xi, ... ,Xn)#g(y1,. . .,ym) 
for all pairs of functions f ,g such that f""" g, 
(3) x#t 
for each variable x and term t such that x ;;t=t and x occurs in t. 
Here, similarly as in the proof of the Unification Theorem 2.2 we identify constants with 0-ary 
functions. Thus (1) includes c = c for every constant c as a special case and (2) includes c=fad for all 
pairs of distinct constants as a special case. 
Observe the striking similarity between the strong equality axioms and steps 1, 2 and 5 of the 
unification algorithm used in the proof of the Unification Theorem 2.2. We shall exploit it in Section 
5.7. 
Given now a program P we denote by comp(P) the set of formulas IFF(P) augmented by the free 
equality axioms. comp (P) is called the completion of P. 
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5.6. Models of completions 
In order to assess the proof theoretic power of completions we study their models first. However, in 
contrast to the case of models of logic programs it is not sufficient to restrict here attention to Her-
brand models. This is the content of a proposition we prove at the end of this section. 
Therefore we shall consider here arbitrary models but we shall study them by means of a natural 
generalization of the immediate consequence operator Tp. First, following JAFFAR., LASSEZ and LLOYD 
[JLL], we introduce the concept of a pre-interpretation for a first order language L. Its definition is 
identical to that of an interpretation given in Section 3.1 with the exception that clause d) explaining 
the meaning of relations is dropped. We then say that an interpretation I is based on J if I is obtained 
from J by assigning to each n-ary relation r of L an n-ary predicate r1 on the domain of J, that is by 
fixing the meaning of the relations of L. Thus each interpretation based on J can be uniquely 
identified with a set of generalized atoms, i.e. objects of the form r(a 1, ••• ,an) where r is an n-ary rela-
tion of Land ai. ... ,an are elements of the domain of J. That is what we shall do in the sequel. 
We now generalize the operator Tp so that it acts on interpretations based on a given pre-
interpretation. To this purpose we first introduce the following useful notation. 
Fix an interpretation I. Let A = p(ti, ... ,tn) be an atom and let a be a state over I. Then we denote 
by Aa the generalized atomp(u(t11), ... ,a(tn1)). 
Let now J be a pre-interpretation and let I be an interpretation based on J. We put for a program 
P and a generalized atom D 
D E Tf,(/) iff for some state o over I 
and a clause B+-Bi. ... ,Bn of P 
we have D = Ba and I F0 B 1 /\. .• /\Bn. 
Thus Tf, maps interpretations based on J to interpretations based on J. Similarly as in the case of Tp, 
the operator Tf, is continuous. The following is an obvious generalization of Proposition 3.7. 
PROPOSITION 5.12. For a program P and a pre-interpretation J, an interpretation I based on J is a 
model of P if! Tf,(I) c;;J. 0 
We now wish to prove a similar characterization for models of completions. To this purpose we 
first note the following. 
LEMMA 5.13. For a program P, P and IF(P) are semantically equivalent. 
PROOF. In steps 1,2,3,5 each formula is replaced by a semantically equivalent one. In tum, in step 4 
valid formulas are introduced. 0 
CoROLLARY 5.14. For a program P and a pre-interpretation J, an interpretation I based on J is a model 
of IF(P) if! Tf,(/) c;;,I. 0 
We also have the following. 
THEOREM 5.15. For a program Panda pre-interpretation J, an interpretation I based on J is a model of 
ONLY-IF(P) iff Tf,(I)";JI. 
To prove it we first need the following lemma. 
LEMMA 5.16. Let I be an interpretation based on a pre-interpretation J and P a program. Let 
'<Ix I··· '<lxn(p (x 1, ••• ,xn)-';F) be a formula in ONLY-IF (P). Then for every state 11 over I 
p(xi. ... ,x,,)11 E I'f,(/) iff b 0 F. 
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PROOF. If p does not appear in a head of a clause in P then both sides of the claimed equivalence are 
necessarily false. Otherwise 
p(xi. ... ,XnP E TJ, (I) 
iff for some state T over I and some clausep(t 1, ••• ,tn)~Bi. ... ,Bm of P 
It=.,.B1 /\. .. /\Bm and a(x;) = T(t;) for i = l, ... ,n 
iff It=aE. D 
PROOF OF 'THEOREM 5.15. We have 
J is a model of ONLY-IF(P) 
iff for every formula 
'Vx1 ... 'txn(p(x1>···•xn)~F) in ONLY-IF(P) 
and every state a over I 
p(xi. ... ,Xn')aEl implies It=aF 
iff (by Lemma 5.16) 
for every relation p of P and state o over I 
p(xl>···•XnpEl implies p(xi. ... ,xn')aET},(I) 
iff TJ,(J) ;:2 I. D 
Combining Corollary 5.14 and Theorem 5.15 we get the following characterization of the models of 
IFF(P): 
THEOREM 5.17. Let P be a program and J a pre-interpretation. Then an interpretation I based on J is a 
model of IFF(P) iff T},(I) = I. 
PROOF. IFF(P) is semantically equivalent to the set JF(P) U ONLY-IF(P) of formulas. D 
Restricting attention to Herbrand interpretations we can now draw some consequences about the 
completion of P. 
THEOREM 5.18 (APT and VAN EMDEN [AVE]). Let P be a program. 
i) A Herbrand interpretation I is a model of comp(P) iff Tp(I) = I. 
ii) comp(P) has a Herbrand model 
iii) For any ground atom A, comp(P) U {A} has a Herbrand model iff A E gfp(Tp} 
PROOF. 
i) Every Herbrand interpretation is a model of the free equality axioms. 
ii) By i) and the Characterization Theorem 3.13. 
iii) By i), Lemm.a 3.12 ii) and Theorem 3.10. D 
Moreover, we have the following observation which brings us to the end of this section. 
PRoPosmoN 5.19. There is a program Panda ground atom A such that comp(P) U {A} has a model 
but it has no Herbrand model. 
PROOF. Take the program P considered at the end Section 4.5. As gfp(Tp) = 0, by Theorem 5.18 iii) 
comp(P) U {q(a)} has no Herbrand model. 
However, comp(P) U {q(a)} is consistent. Indeed, take as a domain of the interpretation a disjoint 
union Z U N of the set of integers and the set of natural numbers. Interpret the constant a as zero in 
the set N and fas a successor function, both on the set l and the set N. Finally, interpret p as true 
for all elements of Z and q true only for the zero of N. The resulting interpretation is a model of 
comp(P) U {q(a)}. D 
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In the next section we provide a characterization of a finite failure which provides a more direct 
proof of the above proposition. 
5. 7. Soundness of the negation as failure rule 
Recall that completion of program was introduced in order to infer negative information from a 
program. We now relate it to the previously studied way of deducing a negative information - that by 
means of the negation as failure rule. To this purpose we first investigate models of the free equality 
axioms. Assume a program P and denote these axioms by Eq. As Eq do not refer to relations, it 
makes sense to say that a pre-interpretation J is a model of Eq. For each ground term t denote its 
value in the domain of J by t1. We write J'r=0 s = t when a(s1) equals a(t1 ). 
LEMMA 5.20. Let J be a pre-interpretation which is a model of Eq. Then the domain of J contains an iso-
morphic copy of u,. 
PROOF. It suffices to show that for all ground terms s,t s1 = t1 implies s=t. We proceed by induc-
tion on the structure of ground terms. 
If s1 = t1 then by axioms 1 and 2 s and t are either the same constants or are respectively of the 
form f(si. ... ,sn) and /(ti. ... ,tn). The claim now follows by axiom 1 and the induction 
hypothesis. 0 
In the sequel we shall identify this isomorphic copy with u,. Given a pre-interpretation J let B1 
stand for the set of its all generalized atoms. If J is a model of Eq then by the above lemma B1 con-
tains an isomorphic copy of the Herbrand base B,. We identify this copy with Br 
The following lemma clarifies the relation between the unification and free equality axioms. 
LEMMA 5.21. (Cl.ARK [C]) 
(a) If the set {s1 == ti, ... ,sn = tn} has a unifier then for some of its mgu {x1 /ui, ... ,xk /uk} 
Eq'r= S1 = t1/\ ... /\Sn = tn ~ X1 = U1/\. .. /\Xk = Uk• 
(b) If the set {s1 = ti. ... ,sn = tn} has no unifier then 
Eq'r= SI = t I/\. .. /\Sn = tn ~ false. 
PROOF. Modify the unification algorithm given in the proof of the Unification Theorem 2.2 as fol-
lows. First display each set { s 1 = t i. . . . , Sn = tn } of equations as a formula s 1 = t 1 /\. .. /\sn = tn. 
Then interpret the replacement and deletion steps as operations on these formulas. Interpret the halt 
with failure action as a replacement of the formula by false. 
Observe that if 1" is obtained from cp by applying one of the steps of the algorithm then Eq l=<f>~i/J. 
Indeed, if x does not appear in t then Eq l=cf!o/\x = t/\cp1 ~ (cf>o/\cp1)[x/t]. Other cases are immediate. 
The lemma now follows from the correctness of the unification algorithm. D 
Call a substitution 8 invariant over a state a if for all x, a(x) = a(x8). 
CoROLLARY 5.22. Let J be a pre-interpretation which is a model of Eq. If/or some state a 
J'r=0 S1 = 111\. .. /\Sn = tn 
then for some mgu 8 of {s1 =ti, ... ,sn =tn} invariant over a 
J'r=(s1 = 111\. .. /\Sn = tn)8. D 
Call now an interpretation I based J good if for all sequences of atoms F and all states a, l'r=0 F 
implies l'r=F8 for some substitution 8. · 
Obviously not all interpretations are good. But those of interest to us are. 
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LEMMA 5.23. Let J be a pre-interpretation which is a model of Eq. Then for every n ;a.O Tf,J,n is good. 
PROOF. We proceed by induction on n. 
For n = 0 we have ~!n = Bi. But B1 <;;.Bi so for all sequences of atoms F and all substitutions a 
BJl=F8 holds. 
Assume now the claim holds for some n ;a.O. Consider a sequence A i. ... ,Ak of atoms. Suppose 
th~t Tf,J.(n + 1)1=0 A 1 ~···AAk f?r .some state a. By the ~efinitio~ of r;, for_each i = l, ... ,k there 
eXlSts a clause B;+-B1 , ••• ,B,,,, m P such that Pp..i,n1=0 B 1 1\ ... 1\Bm, and A;a - B;a. Thus 
T't!nl=o . _ /\ Bj. 
1-l, ... ,k 
j=l, ... ,m1 
By Corollary 5.22 there exists a substitution 8 invariant over a such that A;fE!E.B;8. 
By the definition of invariance 
Tf,J,n1=0 . _ /\ Bj8. 
1-l, ... ,k 
j=l, ... ,m, 
By the induction hypothesis for some substitution y 
T't!n1= ·- /\ Bj(Jy. 1-l, ... ,k 
j=l, ... ,m, 
We can assume that y is such that each Bj(Jy ground. 
Thus for i = 1, ... ,k B;(Jye 'If,..1,(n +l), i.e. for i = 1, ... ,k Tf,..1,(n +1)1=(A 1/\ ... AAk)(Jy. This 
proves the claim for n + 1 and concludes the proof. D 
LEMMA 5.24. Let J be a pre-interpretation which is a model of Eq. Let I be based on J. 
Suppose that I is good. Then 
Bp n 'P,(J) = Tp(Bp nJ). 
PROOF. Suppose A eB1 n 'If,(I). Then for some state a over I A Ba and b=0 A 11\ ... AAn where 
B+-Ai. ... ,An is a clause from P. Thus a when restricted to the variables of Bis a ground substitu-
tion, say 71. We thus have It:0 (A 1 /\. •• AA,,}q. But I is good so for some substitution 8ll=(A 1 /\. .. AAn'r'lfJ. 
Thus B1 nit:(A1 /\ ... /\An}q8. Moreover A Br,8, so A E Tp(Bp nJ). 
If now A eTp(Bp nJ) then a fortiori A eB1 n 'If,(Bp nl), so by the monotonicity of Tf, we have 
A eB, n Tf,(I). D 
This lemma states that all ground atoms inferred from I by means od Tt can already be inferred by 
means of Tp, provided I is good. 
This brings us to the following important consequence of Lemmata 5.23 and 5.24. 
CoROLLARY 5.25. Let J be a pre-interpretation which is a model of Eq. Then for every n ;a.O 
BP n Tf,J,n = Tp.!Ji· 
Consequently 
Bp n 'If,..1,"' = Tpi(.o). 
PROOF. We prove the first claim by induction on n. For n = 0 it is a consequence of the fact that 
Bp<;;;,.BJ. 
Suppose this claim holds for some n ;;.o. Then 
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Bpn~t(n+l) = Bpn~(~!n) 
(by Lemmata 5.23 and 5.24) = Tp(Bp n ~tn) 
(by induction hypothesis) = Tp(Tp!n) 
= Tpt(n +l). 
lbis implies the claim and concludes the proof. D 
Finally, we can relate completion of a program and negation as failure. 
'fHEoREM 5.26. (Soundness of the negation as failure rule) (CLARK [C]) Let P be a program. If A is in 
the finite failure set of P then comp (P)hA. 
PROOF. Let I be an interpretation based on a pre-interpretation J and which is a model of IFF(P). 
Then by Theorem 5.17 ~(/) = I. Thus by Lemma 3.11 
IkP,tw. 
Suppose now moreover that J is a model of Eq, i.e. that I is a model of comp(P). Then by Corol-
lary 5.25 
BpnlkTptw. 
Suppose now that A is in the finite failure set of P. Then by Theorem 5.6 A f/. Tp.,1,"', so by the 
above A f/.Bp nI, i.e. lhA. D 
5.8. Completeness of the negation as failure rule 
We now prove the converse of the above theorem. To this purpose we first show how to construct 
models of the free equality axioms. 
Let e be a set of substitutions. We call e downward directed if 
8;qee => there exists yee 
such that y<O and y<'q. 
Here y<O means that 8 is more general then y. 
Suppose now that e is a set of substitutions. Put for two terms s,t 
s.....,et iff for some 8ees8=t8. 
LEMMA 5.27. Suppose that e is a downward directed set of substitutions. Then .....,e is an equivalence rela-
tion which is a congruence w.r.t. all function symbols. Moreover, the pre-interpretation induced by ......,e is 
a model of Eq. 
PROOF. The relation .....,e is always reflexive and symmetric. By downward directedness of e it is also 
transitive. 
Let [s] stand for the equivalence class of term s w.r.t. ,...,e. Let f be an n-ary function symbol. If 
(si) = (ti), ... ,(Sn)= (tn] for some terms Si.ti. ... ,Sn,tn, then by downward directedness of e for 
someOee 
S 19=.t J 0, ... , Sn9=.tn8. 
Hence f (si, ... ,snYJ=f(ti. ... ,tn)O, i.e. [f (si. ... ,sn)] = [f (ti, ... ,tn)]. 
Thus the equivalence relation induced by "'e is indeed a congruence. This means that ......,e induces a 
pre-interpretation of L. That this interpretation is indeed a model of Eq is easy to see as non-unifiable 
terms have necessarily different equivalent classes w.r.t. -e. D 
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We are now in position to prove the desired theorem. It is formulated in a slightly more general 
form. This theorem is due to JAFFAR, LASSEZ AND LLOYD [JLL]. We follow here essentially presenta-
tion of LLOYD [L] based on a simpler proof due to WOLFRAM, MAHER AND LASSEZ [WML]. 
THEOREM 5.28. (Completeness of the negation as failure rule) Let P be a program. If for a goal G 
comp (P)1=G, then P U { G} has a finitely failed SLD-tree. 
PROOF. Let G = +-A i. ... ,A,,. Suppose that PU { G} does not have a finitely failed SLD-tree. Then by 
Theorem 5.6 there is a non-failed fair SLD-derivation E = +-A = N 0 ,N 1'··· with the sequence of 
substitutions 60 ,l}i, .... We use this derivation to construct a model of 
comp(P}U {3x1 ... 3xe(A 11\. .. AA,)} where xi. ... ,x1 are all variables appearing in G. 
Let e = {60 ... 8; : i;;;;r.O}. Note that eis downward directed. By the last lemma the pre-interpretation 
induced by ....... e is a model of Eq. Let [s] denote the equivalence class under -e of a term s. 
We now construct an interpretation I based on J by putting 
I = {p([ti], ... ,[tn]):p(ti. ... ,tn) appears in E} 
We first show that I!;;; 7't(J}, i.e. that I is a model of ONLY - IF(P). 
Suppose that p(ti. ... ,tn) appears in a goal N; of E. Since E is non-failed and fair, there exists j;;;.i 
such that p(sJ, ... ,sn}==P(t1, ... ,tn)8; ... 8;+j-l is the selected atom in Ni. 
By Corollary 2.4 each Ok can be chosen idempotent. Moreover, these substitutions commute, so 
each element of e is idempotent, as well. Thus for each k = 1, ... ,n 
[tk] = [tk8o ... 8;+j-il 
= [tk8; ... 8i+j-d 
= [sk] 
= [sk8i+j]· 
But by the definition of I we have p([s 18;+j], ... ,[sn8;+j])e7't(J), so p([ti], ... ,[tn])e~(J), as desired. 
Now by Theorem 3.10 and Theorem 5.17 I can be extended to a model of comp(P). By the con-
struction I is a model of 3x 1 ••• 3x e(A 1 /\. •. AA,), and a fortiori so is its extension. D 
5.9. Equality axioms versus identity 
CLARK'S [C] original definition of free equality additionally included the following usual equality 
axioms: 
(1) x = x, 
(2) X1 = J1/\. .. /\Xn = Yn ~ f(xi.···•Xn)=f(yi.···•Yn) 
for each function symbol f, 
(3) XJ = J1/\. .. /\Xn = Yn ~ (p(xi. ... ,Xn) ~ p(yi.···•Yn}) 
for each relation symbol p including =. 
Denote these axioms by EQ. We did not use EQ at the expense of interpreting equality as identity. 
Fortunately, both approaches are equivalent as the following well known theorem (see e.g. MENDEL-
SON [Me] p. 80) shows. 
THEOREM 5.29. Let S be a set of formulas in a first order language L including =. Then for every for-
mula q, 
Sl=q, iff SU EQI=+ q,, 
where 1=+ stands for validity w.r.t. interpretations of L which interpret = in an arbitrary fashion. 
PROOF. =>. An interpretation of = in a model of EQ is an equivalence relation which is a 
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congruence w.r.t. all function and relation symbols. 
This implies that every model of EQ is equivalent (i.e. satisfies the same formulas) to a model in 
which equality is interpreted as identity. This model has as the domain the equivalence classes of the 
interpretation of = with the function and relation symbols interpreted in it in a natural way. The 
proof of the equivalence proceeds by straightforward induction on the structure of the formulas . 
.:=. When = is interpreted as indentity, all axioms of EQ became valid. D 
5.10. Summary 
Summarizing the results obtained in Sections 5.4, 5.7 and 5.8 we obtain the following characteriza-
tions of the finite failure. 
THEOREM 5.30. (Finite Failure Theorem) Consider a program P and a ground atom A. Then the follow-
ing are equivalent: 
(a) A is in the finite failure set of P. 
(b) A Et 1),i"'· 
(c) Every fair SLD-tree with ~A as root is finitely failed. 
(d) comp(P)t=-,A. 0 
These results show that the negation as failure rule is a proof theoretic concept with very natural 
mathematical properties. Comparing the above theorem with the Success Theorem 3.26 we see a 
natural duality between the notions of success and finite failure. 
However, this duality is not complete. By the Characterization Theorem 3.13 and the success 
Theorem 3.26 A is in the success set of P iff A elfp(Tp)· On the other hand the "dual" statement: A is 
in the finite failure of P iff A Etgfp(Tp) does not hold because as noted in Section 4.5 for certain pro-
grams P we have gfp(T/J=l=Tpi"'· 
Clause (d) of the Fmite Failure Theorem suggests another possibility of inferring negation. Con-
sider the following rule implicitly studied in APT and VAN EMDEN [A VE]. 
A is false in all Herbrand models of comp (P) 
-.A 
Call this rule Herbrand rule. Then the results of this chapter can be summarized by the following 
figure from LLOYD [L] (p. 86) assessing the content of Lemma 5.3, Theorem 5.18 iii) and Theorem 5.6. 
-.A inferred under 
Herbrand rule 
FIGUllE 3 
-.A inferred under CW A 
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5.11. Bibliographic remarks 
Theorem 5.17 is a straightforward generalization due to JAFFAR, LASSEZ and LLOYD [JLL] of a special 
case (Theorem 5.18 a)) proved in APT and VAN EMDEN [AVE]. 
Lemma 5.20 appears as an exercise in LLOYD [L] (p. 88). Proofs of Lemma 5.21 and Theorem 5.26 
seem to be new. Lemma 5.21 was generalized by KUNEN [Kul] who proved that that Eq is a complete 
axiomatization for the fragment L( =) of L containing = as the only relation symbol. 
6. GENERAL GOALS 
6.1. SLDNF -resolution 
When trying to extend the results of chapters 3 and 5 to general programs we encounter several 
difficulties. In this paper we examine only a very mild extension of the previous framework, namely 
the use of logic programs together with general goals. This provides some insight into the nature of 
the new problems. 
We have to explain first how general goals are to be refuted. For this purpose we need only to clar-
ify how negative literals are to be resolved. It is natural to use for this purpose the negation as failure 
rule studied in the previous chapter. Strictly speaking this rule was defined only for ground atoms, but 
it can be extended in an obvious way to the non-ground case. 
This leads us to an extension of the SLD-resolution called SLDNF -resolution (SLD-resolution 
with Negation as Failure rule) introduced in Clark [C]. We added the superscript "-" to indicate that 
it is used here only with non-general programs. 
Formally, we first introduce the notion of a resolvent of a general goal. Let P be a program and 
G=+-Li. ... ,L,, a general goal. We distinguish two cases. 
a) Literal L; (l~i~n) is positive. Suppose that C=A+-B1>····Bk is a clause from P. If L 1 and A 
unify with an mgu ()then 
+-(Li , ... ,L;-1,B 1, ... ,Bk>L; + 1, •.. ,Ln)() 
is a resolvent of G and C. 
b) Literal L; (l~i=E;;n) is negative, say -.A;. Suppose that PU{+-A} has a finitely failed SLD-tree. 
Then 
+-L;, ... ,L;-1.L; + 1 •••• ,4 
is a resolvent of G. 
L; is called the selected literal of G. 
Now, given a program P and a general goal G, by an SLDNF -derivation of PU { G} we mean a 
maximal sequence G=Go,G1>··· of general goals together with a sequence Co,Ci, ... of variants of 
clauses from P and a sequence 80 ,(Jl>··· of substitution such that for all i =O, 1, ... 
a) If the selected literal in G; is positive then G;+ 1 is a resolvent of G; and C; with the mgu 6;, 
b) if the selected literal in G; is negative then G; + 1 is a resolvent of G;, C; is arbitrary and 8; is the 
empty substitution, 
c) C; does not have a variable in common with G;. 
Note that if the selected negative literal -,A in a general goal G is such that PU {+-A} has no 
finitely failed SLD-tree, then G has no successor in the SLDNF- -derivation. Also note that a success-
ful resolving of a negative literal introduces no variable bindings. 
The notions of SLD-refutation, computed answer substitution, selection rule and SLD-trees general-
ize in an obvious way to the case of SLDNF- -resolution. In particular we can talk of successful and 
failed SLDNF- -trees. 
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6.2. Soundness of the SLDN F -resolution 
In any soundness or completeness theorem we need to compare the existence of SLDNF -
refutations with some statements referring to semantics of the program under consideration. However, 
a direct use of the programs is not sufficient here because of the negative literals. For example 
P U { ~ -,A } is always consistent. What we need here is an extension of P which implies some nega-
tive information. An obvious candidate is the completion of P, comp(P), which was actually intro-
duced by CLARK [C] to serve as a meaning of general programs when studying SLDNF-resolution. 
After these preparations we can formulate the appropriate soundness theorem, essentially due to 
CLARK[C]. 
THEOREM 6.1. (Soundness of SLDNF- -resolution) Let P be a program and G=~L1,. . .,Lk a general 
goal. Suppose that there exists an SLDNF -refutation of PU { G} with the sequence of substitutions 
Oo,. . .,On. Then (L 1 /\. .. /\Lk)(Jo ... On is a semantic consequence of comp(P). 
To prove it we need the following mild generalization of Theorem 5.26, essentially due to CLARK [C]. 
LEMMA 6.2. Consider a program P and an atom A. Suppose there is a finitely failed SLD-tree with ~A 
as root. Then comp(P)F-.A. 
PROOF. By Lemma 5.7 there exists n0 ~ l such that for every ground substitution 8, PU {AO} has a 
finitely failed SLD-tree of depth :s;;n 0• By Lemma 5.9 for every ground substitution 8, A8~Tpino. 
Suppose now that for some interpretation I based on a pre-interpretation J, lt=co"!P(P), and more-
over for some state a IF .. A. By Theorem 5.17 Tf,(I)=I. Thus by Lem.ma 3.11 Ir;;;,Tf,in 0 • So we have 
Tf,~0 1= .. A. But by Lemma 5.23 Tf,ino is good, so for some ground substitution 0 Tf,inol=AfJ. 
Now by Corollary 5.25 A8ETp~O· This contradicts the former conclusion. D 
We can now prove soundness of SLDNF -resolution. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.1. Let A i. .. .,A1 be the sequence of positive literals of G and --,B 1,. • .,--,Bm the 
sequence of negative literals of G. 
If l=O or m =Owe disregard the corresponding step in the considerations below. 
With each SLDNF -refutation of PU { G} we can associate an SLD-refutation of PU {~A 1,. • .,A1} 
obtained by deleting all resolvents arising from the selection of negative literals and by deleting all 
negative literals in the remaining resolvents. By the soundness of SLD-resolution (Theorem 3.2) and 
the fact that empty substitutions are used when resolving negative literals 
Pt=(A 1 /\. .. AA,)Oo ... fJn . 
But comp(P)t:: IF(P) so by Lemma 5.13 
comp(P)l=(A 1 /\ ... /\A1)80 ... 0n . 
Also, by Lemma 6.2, for i = l,. . .,m 
comp(P)1=--,B;80 ... 8p-1 , 
where --,B;00 ... 8p- I is the selected literal of GP (O:s;;p :s;;;n ). 
Thus 
comp(P)1=(--,B 1/\. .. 1\--,Bm)Bo ... On 
which concludes the proof. D 
COROLLARY 6.3. If there exists an SLDNF -refutation of PU { G} then comp(P)U { G} is inconsistent. 
D 
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6.3. Floundering 
We now consider the problem of completeness of the SLDNP- -resolution. Unfortunately even the 
weakest form of completeness does not hold as the following example shows. 
ExAMPLE 6.4. Consider the following program P: 
p(a)+-p(a), 
r(b)+-. 
Then in every model I of the free equality axioms 
It=('rlx(p(x~x=a /\ p(a)))-+-p(b), 
so by the definition of completion comp(P)t=-p(b ), that is comp(P) U { +--p(x)} is inconsistent. How-
ever, PU { +-p(x)} has no finitely failed SLD-tree,, so there is no SLDNP- -refutation of 
PU{+--p(x)}. 0 
A natural way out of this dilemma is to impose on SLDNF" -resolution some restrictions. Clearly, 
the problem is caused here by the use of non-ground negative literals. Notice for instance that in the 
above example PU { +--p(b)} has a finitely failed SLD-tree so there exists an SLDNF- -refutation of 
PU{+--p(b)}. 
We thus introduce the following restriction. We say that a selection rule is safe if it only selects 
negative literals which are ground. >From now on we shall use only safe selection rules. But a safe 
selection rule is not defined on some sequences of literals. This means that certain general goals have 
no resolvents under a safe selection rule. 
We say that an SLDNF -derivation of P U { G} via a safe selection rule flounders if it is of the form 
G=G0 , ••• ,Gk where Gk contains only non-ground negative literals. PU{G} flounders if some 
SLDNF" -derivation of P U { G} (via a safe selection rule) flounders. 
Obviously, restriction to safe selection rules does not restore completeness of SLDNF -resolution -
a smaller number of selection rules cannot help. But one would hope that a restriction to programs P 
and general goals G such that P U { G} does not flounder but does help. Unfortunately such hopes are 
vain. 
ExAMPLE 6.5. Consider the following program P: 
r(a)+-, 
r(b )+-r(b) , 
r(b)+-q(a), 
q(a)+-q(a) 
and the general goal G=+-r(x), -,q(x). 
We now claim that 
i) P U G does not flounder, 
ii) there is no SLDNF" -refutation of PUG, 
iii) comp(P) U { G} is inconsistent. 
Both i) and ii) are easy to check. To prove iii) take an interpretation I based on a pre-interpretation 
J such that Jt=comp(P). By Theorem 5.17 Tfa(I)=I. Thus by the form of P the following three facts 
hold: 
a) r(a)el, 
b) q(a)el-+r(b)e/, 
c) q(b)~l. . 
This means that either It= r(a)/\-,q(a) or IF r(b)/\-,q(b) holds, i.e. It= 3x(r(x)/\-,q(x)) so G is not 
true in I. D 
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6.4. Restricted completeness of the SLDNF- -resolution 
Thus to obtain completeness of SLDNF- -resolution further restrictions are necessary. To this pur-
pose we first introduce the following notions. 
Given a program P we define its dependency graph Dp by putting for two relations r,q 
(r,q) e Dp if! there is a clause in P using r in its head and q in its body. 
We then say that r refers to q; depends on is the reflexive transitive closure of the relation refers to. 
Thus a relation does not need to refer to itself but by reflexivity every relation depends on itself. 
Now, given a program Panda general goal G, we say that PU {G} is strict if the relations occur-
ring in positive literals of G depend on different relations than those on which relations occurring in 
negative literals of G depend. Note that this implies that no relation occurs both in a positive and 
negative literal of G. 
More precisely, given a program P and a set of relations R first put 
DEP(R) = {q: some pin R depends on q}. 
Then P U { G} is strict if 
DEP(G+) n DEP(G-) = 0, 
where G+ (resp. G-) stands for the set of relations occurring in positive (resp. negative) literals of G. 
Note that for the program P and the general goal G studied in Example 6.5 PU { G} is not strict. 
We now prove the following result established independently by CAVEDON and LLOYD [CL] and 
K.R Apt (unpublished). 
THEOREM 6.6. (Restricted completeness of SLDNF- -resolution) Let P be a program and G a general 
goal such that PU{G} is strict and PU{G} does not.flounder. Suppose comp(P)U{G} is inconsistent. 
Then there exists an SLDNF- -refutation of PU { G}. 
In the proof we shall use the following well known theorem from mathematical logic due to K. 
GMel (see e.g. SHOENFmLD [S]). 
THEOREM 6.7. (Compactness Theorem) A set of formulas has a model if! every finite subset of it has a 
model. 0 
Using the Compactness Theorem we obtain the following lemma which will be needed in the 
sequel. 
LEMMA 6.8. Let P be a program. There exists a model Np of comp (P) such that 
Np n Bp = Tptw. 
PROOF. Let {A i. ... ,An} be a finite subset of Tptw. By Theorem 5.6, for i = l, ... ,n, A; is not in the 
failure set of P. Thus by Lemma 5.8 PU {-+-A i, ... ,An} does not have a finitely failed SLD-tree. Now, 
by the completeness of the negation as failure rule (Theorem 5.28) there is a model of 
comp(P)U{Ai. .. .,An}· Thus by the Compactness Theorem 6.7 comp(P)UTptw has a model, say Np. 
We have 
Np n Bp ~ Tptw. 
Moreover, as already observed in the proof of soundness of the negation as failure rule (Theorem 
5.26), we have by virtue of Lemma 3.11 and Corollary 5.25 
Np n Bp ~ Tptw. 
This concludes the proof. 0 
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The model of comp(P) constructed in this lemma is in a sense "big". Note that by Theorem 5.6 we 
have 
N pt:-,A iff A is in the failure set of P. 
Thus in a sense Np is "dual" to Mp which is a "small" model of comp(P) and for which by the 
Characterization Theorem 3.13 and the Success Theorem 3.25 
M p 1= A iff A is in the success set of P. 
In the proof of Theorem 6.6 we shall use both types of models. But first we need the following sim-
ple modification of Lemma 3.9. 
LEMMA 6.9. Let T be a continuous operator on a complete lattice. Suppose that I ~ T(I~ Then Ttc.>(l) 
is a fix.point of T. 
PROOF. We have 
00 
Ttw(I) - I U U Ttn (/) 
n=I 
00 
(by assumption) = U Ttn (/) 
n=I 
00 
LJ T(Ttn(J)) 
n=O 
(by continuity) = T(Ttw(l)). 0 
Before we apply this lemma we introduce the following notation. Given two programs P 1 and P2 , we 
write P 1 < P 2 to denote the fact that relations appearing in the heads of clauses from P 2 do not 
appear in P 1 • 
Informally, when P 1 < P2 then P 1 does not depend on P 2• More formally, we have the following 
lemma. 
LEMMA 6.10. Let P 1 and P 2 be two programs such that P 1 < P2. Then for any interpretation I based 
on a pre-interpretation J and n;;;;;.: 1 
TJ., (Tf,2 tn (/)) = Tf., ( 0 ). 
PROOF. All elements of Tf,2 tn(J) are of the form r(ti. ... ,t,,,)a where r appears in a head of a clause 
fromP 2• 0 
LEMMA 6.11. Let P 1 and P2 be two programs such that P 1 < P2. Suppose that I is a model of 
comp(P 1) based on a pre-interpretation J. Then Tf,2 tw(J) is a model of comp(P1 UP2~ 
PROOF. By Theorem 5.17 we have I = Tf., (/) ~ Tf., uP, (/). Moreover, Tf., up2 is continuous. By 
Lemma 6.9 Tf,, up2 tw(J) is a fixpoint of Tf., up2 so by Proposition 5.12 Tf., up, tw(J) is a model of 
comp(P 1 UP2). 
On the other hand, using Lemma 6.10 and the fact that Tf., ( 0) ~ I, we get by an induction on n 
Tf.,up2 tn(J) = Tf.1 tn(J) 
for every n ;;;..o. 
Hence 
Tf,, UP2 tw(J) = Tf,2 tw(J) 
which concludes the proof. 0 
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We can now prove the desired result. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 6.6. Let p+ (resp. p-) be the set of clauses of P whose heads contain a relation 
belonging to DEP(G+) (resp. DEP(G-)). By the assumption of strictness, p+ and p- are disjoint. 
For some set P0 of clauses 
P=Pol.Jp+(Jp-. 
Note that p+ U p- < P0 • Consider now the interpretation Mp+ U Nr. Note that Mp• and Nr 
are disjoint because no relation occurs both in p+ and p-. Thus Mp• u Nr is a model of 
comp (P +) U comp (P- ), i.e. a model of comp (P + Up-). This model is based on some pre-
interpretation J. By Lemma 6.11 M = 'I'J,0 tc.>(Mp+ UNr) is a model of comp(P). 
By the assumption comp(P)U{G} is inconsistent, so for some state a 
Jt=aA 1/\ ... /\A11\.....B I /\ ... /\.....Bm 
where A 1'····A 1 is the sequence of positive literals of G and -Jli, ... ,.....Bm is the sequence of negative 
literals of G. 
If e = 0 or m = 0 we disregard the corresponding step in the considerations below. 
By the definition of P + and p- and the form of M we have M p• 1=0 A 1 /\.. •• /\A 1 and 
Nrt:-0 .....B1/\.. .. /\-,Bm. Thus a, when restricted to the variables of A 1/\. .. /\.Ae, is a ground substitution, 
say 8. 
By Corollary 3.6 and the Characterization Theorem 3.13i) 0 is a correct answer substitution for 
p+ U {+-A i. ... ,Ae}. 
Applying now Theorem 3.18 we obtain a computed answer substitution y for p+ U{~Ai, ... ,A 1} 
which is more general than 8. 
Fix some i, 1EO;iEO;m. By the assumption PU{G} does not flounder. Thus if e = 0 then B; is 
ground, so B;o is a ground atom. If e > 0 then B;y is ground, so B;O is ground and consequently B;a 
is a ground atom, as well. But Nrt:-0 .....B1/\ ... /\-,Bm, so B;oEBr \Nr. 
By Lemma 6.8 we now have B;o~Tr tw. By Theorem 5.6 B;o is in the finite failure set of p-. By 
the form of p-, B;a is in the finite failure set of P. 
We thus showed that there exists an SLDNF- -refutation of PU { G }. D 
This theorem can be generalized in the same ways as the completeness theorem of SLD-resolution 
(Theorem 3.15) was. The proofs of these generalizations are straightforward modifications of the 
above proof and use the generalizations of Theorem 3.15 presented in Sections 3.8 and 3.9. 
6.5. Allowedness 
Unfortunately restriction to programs P and general goals G such that PU { G} does not flounder is 
not satisfactory as the following theorem shows. 
THEOREM 6.12. (Undecidability of non-floundering) For some program Pit is undecidable whether for a 
general goal G PU { G} does not flounder. 
PROOF. This is a simple consequence of the computability results established in Section 4.4. 
Let P be a program and q(x) an atom such that the variable x does not appear in P. Note that for 
any ground atom A there exists an SW-refutation of PU {A} iff PU { +-A,-.q(x)} flounders. Indeed, 
in the SLDNF- -derivations no new negative literals are introduced. 
By Corollary 3.14 and Lemma 3.17 we thus have 
A eMp ifJ PU{~A,-,q(x)} flounders. 
But by Corollary 4.7 for some program P Mp is not recursively enumerable. Consequently it is not 
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decidable whether for such a program P, PU { +-A,-,q(x)} does not flounder. O 
A way to solve this problem is by imposing on P U { G} some syntactic restrictions which imply 
that PU { G} does not flounder. 
To this purpose we introduce the following notion due to LLOYD and TOPOR [LT]. Given a pro-
gram P and a general goal G, we call P U { G} allowed if the following two conditions are satisfied: 
a) every variable of G appears in a positive literal of G, 
b) every variable of a clause in P appears in a body of this clause. 
Note that a) implies that all negative literals of G are ground if G has no positive literals and b) 
implies that every unit clause in P is ground. 
Allowedness is the notion we are looking for as the following theorem shows. 
THEOREM 6.13. ( LLOYD and TOPOR [LT]) Consider a program P and a general goal G such that 
P U { G} is allowed Then 
i) PU { G} does not flounder, 
ii) every computed answer substitution for P U { G} is ground. 
PROOF. i) Condition b) ensures that every general goal appearing in an SLDNF- -derivation satisfies 
condition a). Thus PU { G} does not flounder. 
ii) By the fact that every unit clause in P is ground. 0 
Property ii) shows the price we have to pay for ensuring property i). 
Combining Theorems 6.6 and 6.13 we obtain the following conclusion. 
CoROLLARY 6.14. Let P be a program and G a general goal such that PU {G} is strict and allowed. 
Suppose comp(P)U { G} is inconsistent. Then there exists an SLDNF-refutation of PU { G}. 0 
Finally, observe that the definition of allowedness can be weaken a bit by requiring condition b) to 
hold only for clauses whose heads contain a relation appearing in a positive literal of G. Indeed, 
Theorem 6.13 then still holds by virtue of the same argument. 
6. 6. Bibliographic remarks 
Usually, the case of programs and general goals is not considered separately. Consequently soundness 
of the SLDNF- -resolution (Theorem 6.1) is not spelled out separately. The proof of Lemma 6.2 
seems to be new. The problem noted in Example 6.4 was first identified in Cl..ARK [C]. Example 6.5 
seems to be new. The name floundering was introduced in SHEPHERDSON [Sh] but the concept first 
appeared in CLARK [CJ. Theorem 6.12 belongs to the folklore. 
The notion of strictness was first introduced in APT, BLAIR and WALKER [ABW] for the case of 
general programs. The definition adopted here is inspired by CAVEDON and LLOYD [CL] where a 
much stronger version of Theorem 6.6 dealing with general programs is proved. The definition of 
allowedness is a special case of the one introduced in LLOYD and TOPOR [LT] for general programs. 
Similar, but less general notions were considered in CLARK [C], SHEPHERDSON [Sh] and APT, BLAill 
and WALKER [ABW]. 
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7. RELATED TOPICS 
Our presentation of logic programming is obviously incomplete. In this section we briefly discuss the 
subjects we omitted and provide a number of pointers to the literature. 
7.1 General programs 
SLD-resolution and the negation as failure rule was combined by CLARK[C] into a more powerful 
computation mechanism called SLDNF-resolution allowing us to refute general goals from general 
programs. The reader is referred to LLoYD[Ll] for a detailed account of SLDNF- resolution. 
General programs are difficult to study because of their irregular behaviour. For example, they do 
not need to have the least Herbrand model and the completion of a general program can be incon-
sistent. 
Recent work in this area concentrated on a subclass of general programs called stratified programs 
which exhibit a more regular behaviour. Stratified programs are general programs in which recursion 
"through" negation is disallowed. They were introduced in APT, BLAIR and W ALKER{ABW] and VAN 
GEIDER[VG]. They form a simple generalization of a class of database queries introduced in CHAN-
DRA and HAREL[CH]. Further work on this subject was carried out by LIFSCHITZ[LI], 
PRzYMUSINSKI[P] and others. 
SHEPHERDSON[SHE2] discusses and compares various approaches to the proof theory and semantics 
of general programs. 
7.2. Alternative approaches 
The approach to logic programming we discussed in this paper is undoubtedly the most widely 
accepted. However, various alternatives exist and it is worthwhile to point them out. 
Proof theory. FITTING [F] proposed an alternative computation mechanism based on a tableau 
method. GALLIER and RAATZ [GR] introduced a computation mechanism in the form of an inter-
preter using graph reduction. BROUGH and WALKER [BW] studied interpreters with various stopping 
criteria for function-free programs. APT, BLAIR and WALKER [ABW) introduced an interpreter with a 
loop checking mechanism and with an ineffective means of handling negative literals. PRzYMUSINSKI 
[P] generalized this interpreter to an SLS-resolution (Linear resolution with Selection rule for Stratified 
programs) in which negative literals are resolved in an ineffective way. 
Variants of SLD - resolution, called HLSD - resolution and SLD-AL - resolution were introduced 
and studied in NAISH [N] and VmIJ.LE [VJ, respectively. 
Semantics. MYCROFT [My] suggested to use three valued logic (corresponding to the possibilities: 
provable, refuted and undecidable) to capture the meaning of logic programs. This approach was sub-
sequently studied in detail in FITIING [Fl] and KUNEN [Ku]. 
To describe the meaning of general programs MINKER [Mi] proposed the use of minimal models 
(leading to the generalized closed world assumption GCW A), Bmorr and HULL [BH] proposed the use 
of positivistic models and PR.zYMUSINSKI [P] introduced the concept of a perfect model. 
7.3. Deductive databases 
Deductive databases form an extension of relational databases in which some of the relations are 
implicitly defined. They can be viewed as logic programs where the explicitly defined relations are 
those defined only by means of unit clauses, whereas the implicitly defined relations are those defined 
by means of non-unit clauses, as well. Moreover, so-called particularization axioms are needed to 
define the intended domain. Additionally, integrity constraints are used to impose a desired meaning 
on the relations used. 
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The main difference between deductive databases and logic programming lies in their emphasis on 
different problems. In deductive databases one studies such issues like query processing (i.e. computa-
tion of all answers to a given goal), integrity constraint checking, handling of updates (i.e. additions 
and deletions of ground unit clauses) and processing of negative information. 
Recent research concentrates on efficient implementation of recursive queries, i.e. queries about 
recursively defined relations (see e.g. the survey of BANCILHON and RAMAKR!SHNA [BR]), reduction of 
recursive queries to non-recursive ones (see e.g. NAUGHTON and SAGIV [NS]), comparison of expres-
sive power between various query languages (see e.g. CHANDRA and HAREL [CH], SHMUELI [Shm]), 
and handling of negative information both in terms of intended semantics (see e.g. MINKER [Mi], 
.APT, BLAIR and w ALKER [ABW], VAN GELDER [VG], LIFSCHITZ [Li], NAQVI [Na], PRzYMUSINSKl [P]) 
and in terms of query processing, handling of updates and integrity constraint checking (see e.g. 
HENSCHEN and PARK [HP], DECKER [D], LLOYD, SONENBERG and TOPOR [LST]). 
Earlier research in this area is surveyed in GALLAIRE, MINKER and NICOLAS [GMN] while more 
recent research is discussed in MlNKER [Mil]. 
7.4. PROLOG 
PROLOG stands for programming in logic. It is a programming language conceived and implemented 
in the beginning of 1970's by CoLMERAUER et al. [CK.RP]. In its pure form it can be viewed as logic 
programming with the "left-first" selection rule and with the depth-first strategy for searching the 
empty node in an SLD-tree. Negation is implemented by means of the negation as failure rule. For 
efficiency reasons an important test (the check in step 5 of the unification algorithm whether x 
appears in t - so-called occur check) is usually deleted from the unification algorithm and a special 
control facility (called cut) to prune the search tree is introduced. These changes make PROLOG 
different from logic programming and make it difficult to apply to its study the theoretical results con-
cerning logic programming. 
Theoretical study of PROLOG concentrated on efforts to provide a rigorous semantics of it in 
terms of interpreters explaining the process of SLD-tree traversal (see e.g. JONES and MYCROFT [JM]), 
by means of denotational semantics (see e.g. FITTING [Fl]) or by relating both approaches (see e.g. 
DEBRAY and MISHRA [DM]). 
More practical considerations, apart of a study of implementations of PROLOG (see e.g. CAMP-
BELL [Ca]), led to an investigation of efficient backtracking mechanisms (see e.g. Cox and PmrRZY-
KOWSKI [CP]) and of various additions, like meta-facilities (see e.g. BOWEN and KOWALSKI [BK], 
STERLING and SHAPIRO [SSh]), modules (see e.g. GoGUEN and MESEGUER [GM]), control mechanisms 
(see e.g. NAISH [N]) and parallelism (see e.g. Concurrent Prolog of SHAPIRO [Sha] and PARLOG of 
CLARK and GREGORY [CG]). 
Good books on PROLOG programming are BRATKO [BJ and STERLING and SHAPIRO [SSh]. 
7.5. Integration of logi,c and functional programming 
Logic or PROLOG programs use relational notation. This makes it awkward to define functions 
explicitly which have to be rewritten and used as relations. 
Functional programming is based on the use of functions as primitive objects and shares with logic 
programming several aspects like the use of recursion as the main control structure and reliance on 
mathematical logic (especially lambda calculus). 
Several attempts to combine advantages of both formalisms in one framework originated with the 
LOGLISP language of ROBINSON and SmBERT [RS]. 
Direct definition of functions by means of equations leads to the problem how in the framework of 
logic programming equality is to be handled. Solutions to this problem involve the use of extended 
unification, where identity is replaced by equality derivable from axioms defining functions, the use of 
term rewriting techniques in the form of a narrowing procedure and the use of some subset of the 
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standard equality axioms EQ defined in Section 5.9 written in a clausal form. 
Recent proposals in this area are collected in DE GROOT and LINDSTROM [dGL] which is a standard 
reference in this domain. See also BELLIA and LEVI [BL], GALLIER and RAATZ [GR], and VAN EMDEN 
and YUKAWA [VEY]. 
7.6. Applications in artificial intelligence 
Strictly speaking, logic programming is just a restricted form of automatic theorem proving. Various 
proposals of extending it to more powerful fragments of certain logics can be seen as attempts to 
increase its expressive and manipulative power while preserving efficiency. In particular a substantial 
effort has been made to adapt it to the needs of artificial intelligence. While research in this area is of 
a much more practical character, we can still single out out certain investigations of more theoretical 
nature. 
Use of logic programming as a formalism for knowledge representation and reasoning was advo-
cated in Kow ALSKI [Kl]. Analysis and implementation of more powerful logics and various forms of 
reasoning in the framework of logic programming was undertaken by FARI~AS DEL CERRO [Fa] for 
modal logic, by SHAPIRO [Sha] and VAN EMDEN [vE] for quantitative reasoning and by POOLE [Po] for 
hypothetical reasoning. 
More practical work in this area deals with natural language processing, the original application 
domain of PROLOG (see e.g. the special issue of Journal of Logic Programming [JLP]) and with the 
use of logic programming and PROLOG for the construction of expert system shells (see e.g. 
BRATKO [B] and WALKER [W].) 
APPENDIX 
Short history of the subject 
The following is a list of papers and events which have shaped our views of this subject. Obviously, 
this account of the history of the subject is by no means objective (as none is). 
1973: COLMERAUER et al. [CKRP] implemented PROLOG. 
1974: KOWALSKI [K] proposed logic (programming) as a programming language and introduced 
what is now called SW-resolution. 
1976: VAN EMDEN and KOWALSKI [VEK] studied the semantics of logic programs and introduced 
the ubiquitous immediate consequence operator Tp. 
1978: REITER [R] proposed in the context of deductive databases the Closed World Assumption rule 
as a means of deducing negative information. 
1978: CLARK [CJ introduced the Negation as Failure rule as an effective means of deducing negative 
information for logic programs and proposed the completion of a program, comp (P), as a description 
of its meaning. 
1979: Kowalski [Kl] analyzed logic programming as a formalism for knowledge representation and 
problem solving. 
1979: Kowalski [K2] investigated logic programming as a formalism for a systematic development 
of algorithms. 
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.1982: Logi~ programming was chosen as the basis for a new programming language in the Japanese 
Fifth Generation computer system project. 
1982: APT AND VAN EMDEN [A VE] characterized the SW-resolution, Negation as Failure rule and 
completion of a program by means of the operator Tp and its fix.points. 
1983: In the book [CT] edited by K.L. Clark and S.-A. Tiimlund, a number of articles were col-
lected that indicated a wide scope of applications of logic programming and revealed its manipulative 
and expressive power. 
1983: SHAPIRO [Sh] implemented CONCURRENT PROLOG, a natural extension of PROLOG, 
al.lowing us to write concurrent programs. 
1983: JAFFAR, LASSEZ and LLOYD [JLL] proved completeness of the Negation as Failure rule with 
respect to the completion of a program. 
1984: LLOYD [L] gathered in his book several results on logic programming in a single, uniform 
framework. 
1984: A.J. Robinson founded the Journal of Logi.c Programming. 
1986 In the book [dGL] edited by D. De Groot and G. Lindstrom, several approaches aiming at 
an integration of logic and functional programming were presented. 
1986: APT, BLAIR and WALKER [ABW] and VAN GELDER [VG] identified stratified programs as a 
natural subclass of general logic programs and proposed stratification as a means of handling negative 
information. 
1986: J. Minker organized the Workshop on Foundations of Deductive Databases and Logic Pro-
gramming which brought together researchers working in both areas. 
Note 
When this paper neared its completion we learned of the second edition of LLOYD [L], LLOYD [LI]. In 
LLOYD [Ll] a program is called a definite program and in turn a general program is called a normal 
program. Similar terminology is used there for goals and general goals. 
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